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Resumo A Internet e´ hoje a maior rede mundial mas para ale´m disso, e´ tambe´m
e essencialmente um meio de disponibilizac¸a˜o de acesso a conhecimento e
a servic¸os diversos. Tendo como base o protocolo de encaminhamento IP,
e´ poss´ıvel enderec¸ar e comunicar com pessoas, servic¸os, ma´quinas e dis-
positivos variados. Uma forma de comunicac¸a˜o usual assenta no protocolo
TCP, que permite um dia´logo bidirecional entre servic¸os locais e/ou remo-
tos, com toleraˆncia e recuperac¸a˜o face a erros e perda de pacotes. No
TCP, um servic¸o e´ identificado pelo nu´mero do porto a que fica associado,
o que tem algumas consequeˆncias menos positivas. A mais o´bvia e´ o var-
rimento de portos (port scanning) para posteriores tentativas de ataque a
vulnerabilidades nos servic¸os identificados/associados a esses portos.
Esta tese pretende extender o conceito de enderec¸amento dum determinado
servic¸o associando-o primordialmente a um nome, ou seja, dotar o TCP dum
servic¸o pro´prio de resoluc¸a˜o de nomes. A fase de estabelecimento da ligac¸a˜o
TCP, baseada no three-way handshake, pode ser substancialmente evolu´ıda
para suportar mecanismos de resoluc¸a˜o e de autenticac¸a˜o. A soluc¸a˜o en-
contrada tem a seguranc¸a sempre como um aspecto presente e essencial,
por forma a combater diversos tipos de ataque.
A resoluc¸a˜o de nomes sugerida pode ser integrada com mecanismos de
autenticac¸a˜o/validac¸a˜o atrave´s do uso de dom´ınios de interpretac¸a˜o (DOI
- domain of interpretation). Os DOIs possibilitam uma forma flex´ıvel de
adicionar mecanismos de resoluc¸a˜o e autenticac¸a˜o mais ou menos complexos
ao pro´prio estabelecimento da ligac¸a˜o TCP.
Keywords TCP, security, name resolver, name resolution, three-way handshake.
Abstract Internet is the largest network deployed worldwide but besides that it’s also
and essentially a way of accessing and distributing knowledge and a way
to to interact with services. By using the IP routing protocol it’s possible
to address and communicate with other persons, services, hosts or network
enabled devices. An usual way for establishing a dialogue between internet
endpoints is based on the TCP protocol, permitting a bidirectional, reliable
and fault-tolerant data exchange. In TCP a service is identified by an
associated port number which by itself has some less positive consequences.
The obvious one consists on guessing which services are available by find
out the available port numbers (port scanning) so that attacks on service
vulnerabilities can take place.
The purpose of this thesis is to extend the current concept used for ad-
dressing TCP services by associating them with names, or simply to provide
TCP an in-band name resolution. The connection establishment phase,
three-way handshake, can be improved in order to support simple name
resolution mechanisms or even complex authentication. Security aspects
towards avoiding attacks was a major concern that is present in the foun-
dations of the proposed architecture.
The name resolution model can be integrated with several mechanisms for
authentication/validation, implemented as logic defined within domains of
interpretation (DOI). DOIs allow a flexible and extensible way for adding
those mechanisms to the connection establishment procedures of TCP.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Global and distributed attacks, caused directly by attackers or worms1, are very common.
One of the main targets of such attacks is the TCP/IP stack and its services which are deployed
throughout the Internet and mostly visible to everyone. Even if some firewall rules can restrict
access to those services, there is no efficient, transparent and uniform way of imposing a
constraint that assures access only to well intended persons or devices.
Historically, some TCP port names are statically bound to well-known services/servers [34].
Examples are ftp for port 21, telnet for port 23, http for port 80, etc. This static mapping
between names and ports was initially supported by local services using local data (e.g. file
/etc/services in Unix systems). Currently there is a database service with all these static
mappings [33]. However, these mappings are not mandatory; they just reflect a common use.
Nevertheless, well-known services are coupled to well-known port numbers2 and attackers
are aware of this. As an example, if we know that an email service runs on some host, then
we also know it would run on TCP port 25. So, if we want to explore some bug in the email
server, we just need to establish a connection to that host, more precisely to port number 25.
Port scanners simplify the task of exploring which ports are open on a host; thus, the list of
publicly available services running there is easy to obtain.
Given this, other way than numbers should be used to address services. Name systems
are useful for translating user-friendly, readable strings into numerical identifiers. A popular
name system is DNS [26], used for translating hierarchical, typed names into IP addresses,
among other identifiers. Other name services frequently used by applications are RPC name
services, such as rpcbind for Sun RPC and Microsoft Locator for Microsoft RPC. Until now,
there is no widely used, generic name service for transport protocols, such as TCP or UDP.
A simple name service would just provide security by obscurity from attackers sight. Some
sort of authentication method, used to validate the process of connection establishment, would
impose the first real level of security. There are some mechanisms to achieve this, usually
implemented by some out-of-band process like SSTCP and TGTCP [3].
A combined method for in-band name resolution and connection authorization/authenti-
cation, before data exchange, seems to be the more obvious and yet efficient way to achieve
security, right on the transport layer.
1a self-replicating computer program, that uses the network as transport
2a TCP port number is for all purposes a TCP address
1
1.2 Contribution
DNS and RPC name systems are implemented by autonomous servers, using well-known
port numbers, which receive resolution requests from the application layer. Their goal is
to provide a mapping from a name to a number that could be used as a parameter for
lower protocol layers, namely the transport layer. The proposed TCP name system goes in
the opposite direction, which is to integrate name resolution into the existing mechanism
used for TCP connection establishment: the three-way handshake. Consequently, no new or
existing name server is used, which is preferable for fault tolerance, and the name service is
implemented by the TCP layer.
Besides fault tolerance, the new TCP name service was designed with several other goals in
mind. The first one was to maintain compatibility with existing TCP/IP stacks. The second
one was to add a new name service, and not to replace the current number-based addressing
mechanism used by TCP segments with names, as numbers are more efficient to handle than
names. The third one was to allow TCP clients and servers to use arbitrary name formats, in
order not to restrict future uses by upper protocol layers. The fourth one was to add arbitrary
semantics to name resolution, generalizing the third goal.
Finally, the last goal was concerned with security during the name resolution process. If
possible, the model should be robust to attackers that:
• cannot watch the traffic of the remote endpoint;
• could watch the traffic of the remote endpoint;
• could intercept the traffic to the remote endpoint (man-in-the-middle attacks).
The first three goals were realized in a simple TCP name resolution model. This model
changes slightly the current three-way handshake by introducing a resolution request embed-
ded onto the connection request itself. The resolution is made at the remote endpoint and
the answer comes on the reply packet that acknowledges the initial request. The model is
rather simple but some changes are needed to accomplish this, though the whole model can
be implemented on the operating system kernel’s TCP stack. The name resolution is actually
a name equality match against all listening TCP service names. Although the name itself
could eventually contain some form of security aspect (e.g. a one-time password), this was
not explored in this specific model.
An extended model was outlined, comprehending all objectives, from name resolution to
authentication. The new and enhanced model uses the concept of DOI - Domain of Inter-
pretation. The first model’s resolution logic is fixed, whereas this version defines a pluggable
mechanism that interacts closely with the three-way handshake. The interpretation of in-
coming packets, during the connection establishment, is delegated to DOI Resolvers. Thus,
these external user processes can implement the logic they want to either do name resolution,
strictly speaking, or do some kind of authentication, or even do both simultaneously. These
are the foundations of a generic, secure and extensible TCP name service here presented.
The objective of this work was not to substitute application level authentication, mes-
sage privacy or integrity assurance. These can be easily provided by already available and
standard protocols. TLS [8], as an example, permits those characteristics through a in-band
protocol. More, it allows different algorithms to be used for authentication, encryption or for
integrity validation, which are negotiated between endpoints before data transactions. But
being a interim protocol, between the application and the transport layer, has at least two
2
consequences: (i) it only goes in action after the connection establishment and (ii) applica-
tions must be changed to support TLS. Similarly, some implementations exist directly for the
transport protocol, like TCP-MD5 [16] or the recent draft of TCP-AO3 for integrity validation.
The main focus and purpose of this thesis is the definition of a TCP name service, that:
1. validates the connection during its negotiation phase;
2. is transparent as possible to applications;
3. is extensible;
4. interacts in a backward-compatible way with current TCP stacks.
This dissertation is essentially organized in five chapters, besides this introduction and
the ending conclusions.
Chapter 2 covers theoretical concepts focused in networking, with emphasis on TCP de-
tails including the three-way handshake mechanism. Some protocols and systems for name
resolution, their architectures and topologies are also presented. An important subject com-
prehending not only security but also routing, is depicted when firewalls, protocol scrubbers
and NAT are detailed.
In Chapter 3 several worth mentioning, related contributions are analyzed. TCPMUX and
DNS SRV records are methods for in-band and out-of band name resolution, respectively. A
previously submitted IETF draft has some in-band name-based port addressing, but is not
actually a name resolution. Part of this concept was reused for our work but a more general
approach was followed instead, overriding some of its limitations. Security and privacy are
major issues that can be assured/negotiated right from the start - the connection establish-
ment phase. Port Knocking, single packet authentication, SSTCP, TGTCP, OKTCP are just
some solutions more focused on ways of restricting access to TCP services. Secure TCP, as
another example, has both security and privacy goals in mind.
The architecture of the proposed solution is described in Chapter 4. In fact, several models
are presented, not just one, due to evolution during the time frame of this work. First, a
simple name resolution model for TCP is proposed. Later, a complete model involving DOI
Resolvers, running in user space, is laid out.
The proposed models were implemented in Linux by means of some kernel hacking in
the TCP stack itself. Chapter 5 describes some changes that had to be introduced, some
implementation constraints found and some decisions that needed to be taken. API changes,
like the one that defines port access restrictions, and new public structures for TCP endpoints
are also discussed.
For the purpose of testing the proposed models, some tools had to be developed or adapted.
Chapter 6 not only outlines and exposes those tools and developments, but also evaluates the
models through conformity (e.g. interaction between current TCP stacks and the proposed
modified version) and new feature tests. DOI is also validated by means of some real tests.
The thesis conclusions will summarize the key points of this work, referring benefits and
disadvantages. Finally, further study of DOI Resolver models, their direct integration into
TCP client/server applications are some of the items enumerated as future work.
The simple resolution model was successfully published as a short paper entitled “A TCP-
layer name service for TCP ports”[13] which was presented in June 25th, in Boston during the
“Usenix ’08 - Annual Technical Conference” and got printed in the conference proceedings.
3http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tcpm-tcp-auth-opt-00.txt
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Chapter 2
Background
Within this chapter the reader may find some basic concepts on several subjects that
served as background for this work. The topics here described cover three different areas:
(i) networking and transport protocols, (ii) name resolution and service location and (iii)
interferences with the IP end-to-end paradigm.
Special importance should be given to TCP, namely the three-way handshake mechanism
which was the main focus of the proposed architectural changes. Finally, firewalls and NAT
“boxes” are active network components, therefore they can interfere with the communication
between two endpoints assuming some standard behaviors, which may no longer be valid.
Name resolution systems or protocols are referred just to have an idea of the different
topologies and architectures used for name resolutions.
2.1 Communication through networking
To understand what networking is all about, it is important to clarify some concepts.
A packet is composed by a group of bits (or bytes), that are joined into a well structured
set of information. Packets are exchanged between entities, or endpoints, inside network
environments accordingly with some protocol that gives packets their appropriate context.
Protocols are usually stacked in a conceptual network model, delegating responsibilities
and functionalities on each other.
Protocols operating at the same protocol layer perform generally the same kind of
functions. A packet flow indicates the traveling direction for a packet, or group of packets.
A connection or session flow indicates the initial direction, packet flow, that was used to
establish the connection. It might happen that network constraints impose a certain limit for
the packet size, also known as the MTU1. If packets are larger than the MTU, they are either
ignored or split in smaller packets using a fragmentation method. Network applications
communicate with each other using connection-oriented or connection-less protocols.
Their role can be either a consumer/producer of information, which maps a client/server
model, or a distributed and cooperative worker instead, the case of P2P2 networks.
1Maximum Transfer Unit
2Peer-to-Peer
5
Figure 2.1: TCP/IP model vs. OSI Reference model.
2.1.1 TCP
A TCP segment is composed by the TCP header and its data payload. The MSS
is the maximum size a TCP segment can have in a specific direction of a TCP stream,
excluding the TCP header [29]. The MTU, in the TCP/IP model, defines the maximum size
for the IP datagram, which includes the IP header and the TCP segment. While the MTU is
imposed by the network, the TCP stack calculates the MSS to fit the MTU and thus minimize
fragmentation.
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Figure 2.2: Packet encapsulation in datalink, network and transport layers and associated
concepts: frame size, MTU and MSS.
TCP3 [28] is the transport protocol of the TCP/IP protocol stack, on layer 4 of the OSI
Reference model. TCP/IP derives its name from the fact that TCP works on top of IP,
which is the reason why many applications are said to be TPC/IP rather than just TCP.
While a network protocol is used by networking elements for routing purposes, a transport
protocol is an interim layer between applications and the network, for appropriate packet
delivery to applications within of the destination endpoint. So, it can be considered a sort of
3Transmission Control Protocol
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application routing with some control mechanisms for providing reliability to end-to-end data
transmission. TCP is not a closed standard, it has been and will continue to evolve through
time in order to adapt to new circumstances. RFC 4614 [10] provides an overview of TCP,
contextualizes it and presents some existing extensions. TCP features include:
• connection oriented protocol, reflecting a client/server model, though the standard
allows simultaneous opening (a model where both endpoints are clients and servers);
• full-duplex and stream-oriented communication protocol, since data flows simulta-
neously in both directions, being delivered in a continuous, streamed way to applications;
• error detection, by means of a checksum;
• error recovery and concealment, by being able to deal with duplicate or lost seg-
ments;
• reliable data transmission, through acknowledgments and timeouts using ARQ4
methods;
• flow control, for limiting the rate of data transmitted and thus deal with segment flow
constraints;
• congestion control, by means of several algorithms [2] that try to avoid network
congestion;
• ordered data delivery to applications;
• graceful close, to guarantee that data still in transit is delivered correctly when closing
the connection.
TCP is not the only protocol providing the above features. As an example, the OSI5
Transport Protocol Layer [17] specified in ISO/IEC 8073:1997, is composed by a suite of five
protocols. OSI TP46 has some similarities with TCP, more precisely the fact of being a packet
oriented protocol for ordered, reliable data delivery supporting full-duplex. Nevertheless, TCP
is considered to be simpler (e.g. only one common header format where OSI TP4 has ten)
and provides a finer grained control on acknowledged data, since it permits referencing every
octet, while the OSI transport protocol deals with data units (blocks of bytes).
TCP segment
A TCP segment is a packet formed by a TCP header followed by data payload. The
header size is limited by a 4 bit field (data offset) restricting its length to a minimum of 20
bytes and a maximum of 60 bytes.
The source port number is a 16 bit field which specifies the originating transport end-
point, that maps to a connection endpoint used by some application to transfer data. The
destination port number is similar to the previous one, but specifies the destination end-
point. These two fields, while in transit, can be modified (see section 2.3.1) but they are
always the ones that will be used for delivering data to the correct services on upper layers.
The header contains two 32 bit sequencing numbers (sequence and acknowledgement)
which are used by the ARQ method. Data within TCP’s payload is numbered at octet level,
and each flow (client→server and server→client) has its own numbering space, with the initial
number defined by the flow initiator. By allowing each data octet to be indirectly referred
during ARQ, TCP has the basis for a reliable communication protocol.
4Automatic Repeat-Query/Automatic Repeat reQuest
5International Organization for Standardization, http://www.iso.org
6OSI Transport Protocol Class 4
7
Figure 2.3: TCP header: port numbers identify the connecting points for upper layers while
sequencing numbers, window size and checksum provide the means for reliable communica-
tions. Data, e.g. from applications, might follow the TCP header.
The header control bits are used to signal the support of certain features or to report
an event. Initially there were just 6 flag bits (SYN, ACK, PSH, URG, RST, FIN) but latter
[31] two bits (CWR, ECE) were taken from the reserved field.
Finally, the header contains a variable length field with one or more TCP options. Each
option is identified by a kind number, for signalling something, or by a kind with some specific
data attached. These options are a way of adding new features without fixedly allocate bits
inside the TCP header.
The sequence number is the number associated to the first data octet in a segment,
which does not apply for packets with the SYN flag active (SYN and SYN+ACK segments).
In those cases, its value is the ISN7. The acknowledgement number is used to acknowl-
edge previously received data (until the acknowledge number minus one), referring the next
sequence number the sender is expecting to receive; this meaning is effective only if ACK flag
is set. The window tells the receiver how many octets, including the one referenced by the
acknowledge number, the sender may accept. This has to due with the ARQ method and
the sliding window mechanism, described further ahead. As this is a 16 bit wide field, it is
rather limited for current transmission throughputs. To accommodate this, RFC 1313 [18]
introduced a TCP option named TCP Window Scale which scales the window by powers
of 2 (each flow has its own scale factor, if supported).
When the URG flag is present, the urgent pointer indicates an offset from the sequence
number for the boundary of the “urgent data”. Data octets bellow the urgent pointer are
considered urgent and the receiving TCP stack is responsible for giving this data the proper
processing priority, e.g. by adding it to a distinct, high-priority, queue.
A checksum is used for basic error detection. Its calculation covers a pseudo header,
with network layer addressing information and some transport layer details, the real TCP
header (excluding checksum field) and payload.
7Initial Sequence Number
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TCP Finite State Machine
TCP, like all connection-oriented protocols, has a finite number of states corresponding
to a Mealy machine [24] where transitions occur due to systems calls, received packets or
even because of timeouts. These states represent the connection life cycle, which involves
primarily setting it up, either by initiating it (SYN SENT state) or else by listening for
incoming connections (LISTEN state).
Latter, data transfers take place during the ESTABLISHED state. Finally, either by
client’s active close or by server’s passive close, the connection is terminated, leading to the
CLOSED state, the same one that is used to refer when there is no connection at all.
Figure 2.4: TCP Finite State Machine: the typical flow of clients is represented by a con-
tinuous dark line; the server typical flow is represented by a dark slashed line. States are
represented as rectangular boxes.
When protocols, like TCP, follow a state machine and need to keep track of some con-
nection related variables, then they must reserve some memory for this purpose. A TCB8 is
a structure that must be created at both endpoints to store all needed information related
with a ongoing connection.
8Transmission Control Block
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Three-way Handshake
In TCP, the connection is established using the three-way handshake mechanism. Its main
purpose it to synchronize/exchange sequence numbers that will be used by each endpoint in
both packet flows (client→server and server→client). Another purpose of the three-way hand-
shake is mutual agreement, that is, a connection is only initiated if both involved endpoints
accept the “terms”. Some of these are negotiated as TCP options in the SYN and SYN+ACK
segments during the handshake. For successful connections, the method works as follows:
1. A client issues an active connect. A TCB is instantiated to accommodate the ongoing
connection details. An initial sequence number (ISN) for the client→server packet flow is
created. Part of this ISN’s value is incremented with time while another is randomized,
in order to avoid problems with old packets buffered in the network. This ISN is also
known as ISS9. A SYN flagged segment is sent to the destination, with no other active
flag. This packet has no data attached;
2. A listening server (passive connect), with its own assigned TCB, receives the SYN seg-
ment, does basic packet validation and looks for an application using the destination
transport port number. If found, an empty SYN+ACK segment is issued to the origina-
tor. This packet has the SYN and ACK flags enabled and the acknowledgement number
equals ISS+1. This packet’s sequence number is also an ISN, calculated the same way
but independently from the received ISS;
3. The client receives the SYN+ACK segment, validates it and then creates an ACK segment
with the sequence number ISS+1 and the acknowledge number equal to ISN+1. From
the client’s point of view, the connection has been established successfully;
4. The server receives the ACK segment, validating it. The server finally considers the
connection to be successfully established.
After initiating the connection with the first SYN, the connection process can be aborted
through a RST segment sent:
• by the server, instead of the SYN+ACK segment (e.g. if no application is listening on
the destination port number);
• by the client, instead of the ACK segment (e.g. if sequence numbers are invalid);
• by the server, when receiving the ACK segment (e.g. if it’s not possible to create a
connection due to lack of resources).
This RST segment may contain a payload describing the reset cause, though typical TCP
stacks do not use this functionality neither provide an API for applications to obtain this.
Even if service addressing is not a three-way handshake specific feature, it is implicitly asso-
ciated with it since the transport port numbers are exchanged and used to lookup services
during the TCP’s connection phase. As mentioned earlier, a server, upon receiving a SYN
segment, looks for a listening service endpoint. This is done looking at the destination port
number among other fields (e.g. a service can be bound to a TCP port number only on some
network addresses). Usually, the client does not specify the source port number, and thus the
operating system is responsible for allocating a free, random, port number. Otherwise, the
client can indicate a specific port number or reuse an existing one.
9Initial Send Sequence number
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Figure 2.5: Segments exchange in a standard three-way handshake, with sequence and ac-
knowledgement numbers. Successful connection flow is represented by filled line while an
alternative server reply is represented by a slashed line due to connection rejection (note that
RST segment can also occur after receiving SYN+ACK or ACK segments).
A variant of TCP, Transaction/TCP [5] [6] was specified for efficient request→reply trans-
actions. T/TCP uses a method named TAO10 that may fallback to the standard three-way
handshake. This method combines SYN and FIN flags with data in requests, while on replies
a SYN+ACK+FIN segment is sent along with the response. Finally, an ACK is dispatched to
the server, acknowledging the received response.
 
 
 
 
Client Server 
SYN+FIN 
(data request) 
SYN+FIN+ACK 
(data reply) 
ACK 
 
SPT 
 
½ RTT 
Figure 2.6: Minimal transaction in T/TCP using TCP Accelerated Open. RTT is the round-
trip time and SPT is the server processing time.
10TCP Accelerated Open
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Closing the connection in TCP is not abruptly done. A graceful close mechanism ensures
that data previously sent is acknowledged by the receiver and that all received data is likewise
acknowledged. This mechanism is similar to three-way handshake (also known as modified
three-way handshake) but involves four segments instead of three, since each flow is closed as
if it were an independent connection.
TCP Windowing
When a receiver issues a ACK flagged segment, the window field informs the destination
of how many data octets the receiver is capable of processing - its receive window . It also
indirectly points to the last acknowledged octet, through the acknowledgement number, since
acknowledgments are cumulative. In fact, there are two windows used internally on TCP
stacks: the send window and the receive window . The send window “informs” the sender
of the range of valid sequence numbers acceptable by the receiver. The receive window
maps a range of valid sequence numbers that the receiver will consider valid. These two
windows are implicit concepts of a sliding window [7] mechanism, which is used to increase
throughput while preserving reliability and flow control. A sender starts by sending several
segments, within the send window , and a timer starts for each outgoing segment. The timer
is cleared upon receiving an ACK segment which explicitly acknowledges a previously received
segment or implicitly more, due to cumulative acknowledgment. An acknowledgment can be
piggy-backed into a data segment for increased efficiency by avoiding increasing RTT11. If it
timeouts, the segment is retransmitted. The receiver will issue an ACK when it receives valid
data within the receive window , acknowledging the last contiguous octet processed. The send
window “slides” as soon as old octets have been all acknowledged.
Figure 2.7: TCP receive window and pointers to distinguish several categories.
Cumulative acknowledgments behave poorly on lossy or high-bandwidth/large window
networks, since any segment can be lost. SACK12 options [23] introduced the possibility to
acknowledge non-contiguous blocks of bytes.
11Round-trip Time
12Selective Acknowledgements
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Figure 2.8: TCP send window and pointers to distinguish several categories.
PAWS13 [18] defines a mechanism to protect against colliding sequence numbers due to
wrapping of the 32 bit sequence fields on high speed networks. By using a TCP option to
embed a timestamp to each segment, it allows the receiver to distinguish old from new packets.
2.2 Name resolution and service location
2.2.1 DNS
DNS14 [25] [26] is an extensible infrastructure that maps names into addresses. Before DNS,
there was an unique file [15] which had all the mappings for every host name. As Internet
growth demanded, a distributed, hierarchical name space architecture was devised. The
name database is distributed, as well as the responsibility to maintain it updated, by several
domains and hierarchy dependent DNS zones explained ahead. Each domain is responsible
for providing a set of DNS names. A DNS architecture is composed by:
• a domain name space and RR15, which define how information is described and
stored in a tree structured way;
• domain name servers: daemons responsible for handling name resolution requests.
Domain Names under the authority of a Domain name server are directly resolved by
this server; other names are resolved by other Domain name servers;
• resolvers: clients or embedded library functions that interact with name servers for
name resolution. These functions are now part of standard libraries, like glibc16.
Internet names are organized in an hierarchy where names belong to some domain, that
may be part of some parent domain and this in turn can belong to one larger domain.
For addressing purposes, this tree like dependency is represented linearly in plain text,
interpreted from left to right. Name entries are specified in “.” delimited labels of up to 63
13Protect Against Wrapped Sequence numbers
14Domain Name System
15Resource Records
16http://www.gnu.org/software/libc/
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characters each, and can be either described in an absolute or relative manner. An abso-
lute domain ends in “.” (e.g. docs.example.com.) while a relative name contains just some
consecutive starting labels (e.g. using the earlier example, the entry just would be docs).
TLD17 is the topmost domain name of an absolute domain name (e.g. .com, .pt, ...), which
conceptually precedes a final null string - the root domain. This special domain is managed
by a set of well-known root servers spread around the world. The DNS root is managed by
IANA while TLDs are created by IANA/ICANN, which delegates responsibility for each TLD
on local organizations.
Figure 2.9: DNS and the Domain Namespace.
A DNS zone is a subset of the DNS name space, whose management is independent.
As an example, an entity responsible for example.com domain may want to delegate the
shops.example.com subdomain name space management to some enterprise. Common RR
types are the following: A, AAAA, PTR, MX and CNAME. An A RR is used to map a
host name to an IPv4 address, while an AAAA RR does the same for IPv6. A PTR RR maps
an IPv4/6 address to a fully qualified domain name. The MX RR allows the definition of the
mail servers responsible for emails sent to mail addresses specifying the domain. By using a
CNAME RR, it is possible to create a name alias (e.g. to differentiate services) for existing
names. The aliases may be resolved to names outside the DNS zone.
An important characteristic of DNS is that its entries are valid during a TTL18, which is
returned on DNS resolution replies, and can therefore be cached by resolution clients.
A client or library wishing to do name resolution, if not cached, must query the DNS either
by issuing a TCP connection to port 53 or by doing a request on top of UDP datagrams, also
17Top-Level Domain
18Time To Live
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to port 53. Queries can be either recursive or iterative. In recursive queries, the first DNS
resolver tries to resolve the request if the name belongs to its zone, if not it issues a resolution
request to root servers, transversing the tree from up to bottom, until reaching the name server
responsible for the zone of the domain. In iterative queries, the client iteratively asks DNS
servers for a resolution for the intended name, starting with the local configured DNS server
and then going through the root servers, the TLD servers, and down under. Local systems
usually cache resolution replies for reducing the overall resolution workload and improving
resolution efficiency.
2.2.2 RPC and ONC RPC
RPC19 is a client/server mechanism used to remotely execute procedures in distributed
systems. ONC20 RPC [38] is an Internet Santdard proposed by Sun that will be hereafter
referred as RPC. A RPC program providing some functionality registers itself in a port
mapper [37] passing its own program service number, a version number, a local network
identifier, an ASCII string formatted (universal) transport address and a string identifying the
program’s owner. A client that wants to execute a remote procedure on a server contacts the
port mapper running at the server’s host and asks for the universal address of the procedure,
which in fact corresponds to the transport protocol details (which one, TCP or UDP, and
respective port number) where the pretended service is listening. To invoke the remote
procedure, the client contacts the remote server’s universal address, with the already known
RPC program number and version. The port mapper lookup service functionality is in fact a
RPC service, having the predefined program number 100000 assigned. It listens in port 111
of either TCP or UDP transport protocols. A port mapper server resolves only local names,
i.e. names assigned to local servers.
2.2.3 CORBA
CORBA21 is a standard mechanism and architecture for allowing communication between
objects, independently of their location and of their implementation language. An important
component of CORBA is the ORB22. This can be an embedded kernel or application function,
a set of libraries or even a distinct process. It acts as middleware that makes an access to an
object transparent by:
• defining a common interface for object/service management;
• providing location and directory services;
• mediating the communication between objects;
Due to these features, ORB promotes object interoperability. From a client side perspec-
tive, the remote object seems local since it is transparently resolved and accessed. Multiple
ORBs can communicate with each other, increasing transparency between different domains.
The servers publish the name and the persistent object reference in the ORB while clients
only need to obtain, just once, a reference to the object through the name. This is possible
because CORBA has a name service interface entitled CosNaming23. Names associated to
19Remote Procedure Call
20Open Network Computing
21Common Object Request Broker Architecture
22Object Request Broker
23CORBA Common Object Services Naming
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objects are structured in a tree graph and they are resolved in a context, which in this case
corresponds to the graph node object and its leaf objects.
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Figure 2.10: ORB - Object Request Broker, acting as a bus and mediating communication.
2.2.4 RMI
RMI24 is a RPC implementation for Java. In a client/server model or in distributed
architectures, objects can exist throughout system nodes. An application wishing to take
advantage of this model, must somehow obtain a reference to the object and to the actions
(methods) it wants to execute on it. In order to locate remote objects and their methods,
some steps must be taken though:
• a RMI registry service must be running;
• the remote class must extend a special interface, UnicastRemoteObject, and the remote
methods must declare to throw a RemoteException exception;
• the remote application must bind the instantiated class with the local RMI registry;
• client application must declare the interface used to access the remote methods;
• client application must do a RMI registry lookup on the host where the object exists.
RMI registry name space does not follow an hierarchy concept since any name can be
used to bind an object and name spaces are local to hosts. In terms of protocol, applications
communicate with the RMI registry and remote objects through TCP ports 1099 and 1098,
respectively.
2.2.5 JNDI
JNDI25 was introduced by Sun, just like RMI, and is an interface, not an implementation,
that allows naming and directory services. As name tells, it was specified for Java and its
abstraction uses specific Java classes. An InitialContext, somehow similar but not equal to
a root server in DNS, must be defined. It specifies the underlying mechanism that supports
the interaction with JNDI (e.g. LDAP, filesystem, DNS or other). Names are organized in an
hierarchy, deriving the fact that a name can be a set of well organized Names - a Compound-
Name. Through JNDI naming functionality it’s possible to do name lookups, bind/unbind
24Remote Method Invocation
25Java Naming and Directory Interface - http://java.sun.com/jndi/
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Figure 2.11: RMI: at start a “server”/remote application registers the object in the RMI
registry and defines a location for its classes so clients can dynamically download them. A
client application that wants to execute a method on a remote object, consults the RMI
registry which returns an address to the remote object. If the client does not have the object
class definition locally, then fetches it from the remote web server.
names to/from objects or even rename them. The directory interface permits to obtain at-
tributes of certain objects or do searches based on those attributes. There’s the possibility to
asynchronously receive events when changes occur in naming or directory services.
Figure 2.12: JNDI Architecture: multiple underlying implementations for naming services are
supported, including RMI.
Applications must use the JNDI API in order to resolve names, which invokes processing
logic at the Naming Manager. JNDI SPI26 is a layer that abstracts the access to underlying
naming systems, the supporting base of JNDI.
26Service Provider Interface
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2.2.6 NIS, NIS+ and LDAP
NIS27 and NIS+ are mainly directory services, although they can provide naming facilities.
The main purpose of these systems was distribution of configuration files across a domain,
from a central server(s). NIS+ improved NIS by introducing data authentication and encryp-
tion. NIS+ organizes information in a tree structure while the NIS database just allows a plain
key→value mapping. The underlying protocol is ONC RPC based, meaning that a client must
contact the server’s port mapper to thereafter communicate directly with the NIS/NIS+ server
instance.
LDAP28 [42] is a protocol [36] for accessing a directory service composed by a organized
set of information, through a client/server model. LDAP’s DIB29 contains user and adminis-
trative/operational information, which is organized in a tree structure named DIT30. Objects
governed by the DIT contain a set of attributes, than can be me manipulated or queried. An
object is uniquely identified by its DN - distinguished name. Although LDAP messages can
be directly mapped to TCP31, any connection-orient transport protocol can be used.
2.3 Interferences with the IP end-to-end paradigm
2.3.1 NAT and PAT
A widely deployed routing solution is NAT32 [12]. NAT was originally devised in order to
solve two problems: (i) IP address depletion and (ii) scaling in routing. While the first could
be achieved by newer protocols like IPv6, the latter is not so easy to carry out. By means of
address reusing, NAT allows hosts of different realms to transparently communicate with each
other. The primary key assumption for NAT is that only a very limited number of hosts, at
a certain time, are in fact communicating to hosts outside of the domain. Considering this,
only very few addresses might be needed from the outer of domain perspective.
Every realm contains its address space that can collide with some other domain’s address
space. NAT operates at the borders of the domain, acting on inbound and outbound traffic.
An entity doing NAT must translate inner domain addresses into reusable outer addresses,
which are either a subset of the domain’s original address space or simply belong to another
network range. Considering one outgoing connection, to the domain’s exterior, the packet’s
source IP is translated to one free reusable address at the NAT entity. Therefore, during the
session existence, a mapping table must exist for a correct packet routing, for either packet
flow.
A side effect of using NAT is increased privacy because the private addresses of the domain
are not seen in the exterior; they are translated to a set of global, or even public, addresses.
Since some applications and upper protocols negotiate addresses and ports inside the packet’s
or protocols’ payload, ALG35, as defined in RFC 2663 [39], need to couple and interact with
NAT in order to produce a correct and complete translation. FTP and SIP are good examples
of protocols that need specific ALG logic for NAT transversal.
27Network Information Service, sometimes referred as Sun’s Yellow Pages
28Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
29Directory Information Base
30Directory Information Tree
31Usually LDAP uses TCP ports 389 or 636 (SSL). Microsoft’s Active Directory, uses 3268 and 3269 instead.
32Network Address Translator
35Application Level Gateway
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Figure 2.13: NAT and PAT (http://www.h3c.com): packets 1, 2 and 3 are translated through
NAT from 192.168.1.0/24 network to the switch’s public IP 202.169.10.1, while packet 4 source
port is translated from 17110 to 22220 through PAT34.
Major advantages can be summed as:
• Address reusing, providing domain administrators an efficient way for solving the ad-
dress space limitations;
• Multiple, cascade NAT operations can be performed transparently for most applications;
• Apparent privacy for domain hosts, since their IP is not advertised outside of the do-
main. A more important drawback, related with this, is defined bellow.
Although its apparent simplicity, some disadvantages may be pointed to NAT.
• The connection semantics from end-to-end is somehow lost, because IP’s are translated
in every hop that performs NAT. Moreover, there’s distributed state information that
must be maintained during the session, so all packets are routed correctly (the packet
by itself no longer has all the necessary routing information). Besides memory usage,
the NAT entity must also keep track of session flows and know exactly when to remove
idle sessions. Given this, DoS attacks can arise.
• Applications must be NAT aware if they use, at protocol layer, IP addresses or transport
ports to do some kind of validation or for processing reasons. This application layer
modification might not be trivial.
• Problems dealing with current, NAT incompatible, deployed protocols. An entity per-
forming NAT, must be application level compatible through some ALG, that means that
it has to know upper layer protocols and modify packets accordingly. Besides changing
IP address and updating checksum on the packet, it might need to modify also the TCP
header (checksum, sequence numbers) or even the TCP payload.
• Constraints on security and privacy mechanisms. As layer 3 (IP) has to be modified and
layer 4 (TCP/UDP) possibly has to be adapted, information contained on these layer’s
headers cannot be used safely for some security mechanism based on IP’s, TCP header
checksums, etc. Also, it can be hard to track the real origin of a problematic traffic
source since the packet’s source IP is no longer the original one.
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Nowadays, an evolution of the original concept behind NAT is used to map either pairs
of 〈src IP, UDP/TCP src port〉 or 〈dst IP, UDP/TCP dst port〉 for outgoing or incoming
packet flows, in a certain domain, respectively. Entities or devices using NAPT36 [39] must
keep a table with these pairs. This mechanism increases address reuse because very few
external addresses need to be mapped to, since UDP/TCP ports are also used for the address
translation and routing. There are also several NAT variants like Twice NAT that does NAT
for the source and destination addresses (IP + UDP/TCP port).
2.3.2 Protocol Scrubbers
Networks are very heterogonous, containing a mixture of devices and hosts with different
stack and applicational behaviors. Attackers wishing to take control of systems can take
advantage of the different singularities of each implementation inside the domain. Practical
examples include, insertion and evasion attacks [30] which are used to modify traffic seen by
a certain peer, in this case an IDS37. This is accomplished by inserting specific packets in the
network which are accepted by the IDS but rejected by the destination peer - insertion attack
- and also packets that are ignored/rejected by the IDS but that are in fact accepted by their
destination - evasion attack.
A protocol scrubber [22] is an active, transparent mechanism used for traffic normaliza-
tion. It can act either at transport or at application levels. A protocol scrubber defines a set
of common rules to validate a specific protocol and may impose a common flow accordingly
with a state diagram, where applicable. Besides shaping traffic and consequently constraining
attacks, protocol scrubbers can also behave like active NID38 systems, reporting whenever
some endpoint tries to explore some protocol hidden feature or some implementation charac-
teristic. By eliminating protocol ambiguity, outside attackers only see one interpretation of
that protocol and are forced to deal with more restrictive rules which are normally not explic-
itly specified by standards. An example can be a TCP/IP protocol scrubber (see Fig. 2.14)
where TCP fields can be validated more restrictively and certain values can be either forced
or denied. Also, the way overlapping or duplicated segments are processed is standardized by
means of this mechanism.
2.3.3 Firewalls
A firewall is a network security barrier. There are several definitions for firewalls due to
recent evolution on two aspects: networking and security. A possible definition for a firewall
could be: “firewall - a functionality provided by software or hardware device(s)
that allows, restricts, inspects, modifies, encrypts, tunnels or proxies network
traffic between different security domains accordingly with some rules”. Nowadays,
most firewalls have built-in NAT/PAT support. It is also becoming common to find VPN
functionality among the firewall features.
In its more simple and earlier version, a firewall just did basic packet filtering, operating
at the network and/or transport layers. As every packet was treated independently, these
firewalls were called to be stateless since no extra information was necessary for the decision
logic. Most traffic is bidirectional, thus rules had to take this into consideration, so besides
36Network Address Port Translation
37Intrusion Detection System
38Network Intrusion Detection
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Figure 2.14: TCP protocol scrubber: unlike an ordinary transport proxy, a protocol scrubber
acts actively on traffic, validating and enforcing common rules. A transport proxy relays
traffic.
rules n’plication, there was a huge limitation preventing an accurate way of defining correct
and fully restrictive rules.
A demand for connection aware firewalls emerged and stateful firewalls started to appear.
The state can be just a pair of address related values or have even more complex information,
like the local/remote mapping used in NAT or other used by VPN.
A simple stateful firewall implementation is a circuit-level firewall that monitors the con-
nection handshake and only forwards packets if a connection was previously authorized. A
connection identifier (like source and destination IP addresses and TCP/UDP ports), sequence
numbers data, among other, must be saved in the state structure.
An application layer firewall goes a step further by analyzing data exchanged in packets,
typically from the application layer. FTP or SIP are examples of protocols that negotiate
transport protocol details at application level.
Application gateways are proxies that relay traffic for a well known protocol, which is
used by some application. During transactions, two connections exist: one between the local
“client” and the proxy and another one between the proxy and the remote endpoint. There
is no transparency for clients because they must be proxy aware.
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Dynamic packet filtering or stateful inspection, is a firewall method that looks deeply
at the packet, analyzing the network layer up to the application layer, so packets are fully
evaluated in their full context. This method works transparently, unlike application gateways.
There are tools for Linux based distributions that permit IPv4 and IPv6 packet filtering
and NAT/PAT based on an ordered list of rules: iptables and ip6tables. Because Linux
permits connection tracking through the netfilter framework39, it’s possible for iptables to
behave like a stateful firewall.



Figure 2.15: A firewall in action: HTTP requests to the Web Server are only allowed when
originated in the Desktop PC. The firewall rules only allow traffic for the destination TCP
port 80 coming from the Desktop PC’s IP address.
39http://conntrack-tools.netfilter.org
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Chapter 3
Related Work
In this chapter are briefly described several contributions concerning two subjects: binding
of names to transport ports, or services, and access control mechanisms.
3.1 TCPMUX
TCPMUX is a service using TCP port 1 which allows a host to provide a port name handoff
service for itself [21]. A client host opens a connection to port 1 on a server host and transmits
the desired port name in the data stream; the server replies with a positive or negative name
resolution by means of a reply character in the data stream. If the named service is available,
the connection is transferred to the desired service.
In Linux systems, the TCPMUX service is provided for named services handled by the
inetd daemon. Thus, arbitrary servers cannot provide name-number bindings to TCPMUX;
only servers listed in inetd configuration files can have named ports.
The use of TCPMUX is not transparent to clients, as they must use in a different way the
connection to a server: first they must contact the TCPMUX and provide the port name, then
they interpret the TCPMUX reply and only afterwards, in case of success, they may proceed
with the intended client-server interaction. Most client-server applications using TCP use a
different approach, they contact directly a target server using its port number.
3.2 DNS SRV records
RFC 2782 [14] defined a new type of DNS records, SRV RR, for resolving port names to
a set of 〈host DNS name, port number〉 pairs. By creating service. proto.name SRV RR
entries in the DNS, domain administrators are able to specify a set of locations (hosts) of a
given service described by a friendly name, for the domain. For example, when the name
foobar. tcp is resolved in a DNS domain, it returns a set of 〈host DNS name, port number〉
pairs where the foobar service over TCP may be found.
These records are very useful for locating public services with well-known names (e.g. SMTP,
FTP servers) in a domain, but are not well suited for dealing with arbitrary port names used
in ad-hoc client-server connections, because:
• The client application must first learn the DNS domain of the target host before resolving
the port name. For instance, to connect to port foobar at host 192.168.1.1, the client
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must first discover the DNS domain of 192.168.1.1 (e.g. example.org) and then resolve
the name foobar. tcp.example.org;
• The server host must have a DNS name so that clients could match target IP addresses
with host names returned by SRV RR resolutions;
• Requires frequent DNS updates, and the inherent administrative privileges to do so,
in order to dynamically create SRV RR entries whenever servers bind names to port
numbers. This is a major blocker for dynamic port name definition and for normal
end-user usage of port names.
3.3 Port Knocking and Single Packet Authorization
Port Knocking1 (PK) is a mechanism for restricting access to sensitive services, by allowing
only authenticated requests to reach a server. It is a passive authentication scheme for TCP
connections, acting as an auxiliary and external mechanism, independent of the kernel and
the applications. The so called knock or authentication, as originally devised, is a sequence of
connection attempts to closed ports, which are intercepted and validated by a Port Knocking
daemon at the server host (or some intermediary firewall). After a correct knock by a client,
the daemon allows it to connect to the wanted service port.
The sequence of ports contacted in a knock can have an encoded meaning, like the origin
IP, the remote port number and a checksum, that allows further control of the connection
establishment. By introducing a random number as a one time password, it’s possible to limit
replay attacks.
There are different flavors of Port Knocking mechanisms, though. As transport protocols,
either UDP or TCP SYN packets can be used to provide the authentication information.
While the former might seem more appropriate, mainly due to its connection-less character-
istic, the latter has a bigger header with some extra fields, besides the source/destination
port numbers, that can be safely used to encode additional authentication information. Be-
yond TCP and UDP, ICMP can also be used as a “transport protocol” for the authentication
data (implementations include Barricade2, Cerberus3). In this case, an ICMP echo packet,
“ping”, is crafted with a one time password which is in fact a hash of variables specific to
the connection. In Single Packet Authorization [32] (SPA), a deviation of PK, a single packet
contains the necessary information to authorize the TCP connection. SPA aims to present
an alternative solution to the original PK that used just TCP/UDP port numbers to encode
the authentication information. Combining all in the data part of just one packet increases
efficiency and throughput, while allowing additional security features to be built-in due to
the available space within the packet.
Port Knocking is a simple concept that can be easily implemented using already available
tools. Nevertheless, its implementation requires:
• a Port Knocking daemon between the client and the server;
• a firewall between the client and the server and a mechanism to interact with it in order
to modify permission rules as needed;
1http://www.portknocking.org
2http://www.lightning.eu.org/barricade/
3http://silverstr.ufies.org/blog/archives/000625.html
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Figure 3.1: Original conceived PK mechanism, explained from left to right: client wants to
connect to the service available through TCP port n but that port, like all others, is closed
from outside access. Client then issues a series of connection attempts, in a specific order,
that will be processed by a port knocking daemon. The latter validates this sequence and, if
successful, opens a firewall rule allowing the incoming connection to the service listening on
TCP port n.
• a range of closed ports for detecting knocking sequences.
• a client application, or some library functions, to carry on the knock before starting a
connection to a protected port.
Some problems also arise from PK usage, such as the validation of source IP’s in networks
where NAT is performed. Some workarounds (like fwknop4) exist but they tend to increase
the complexity of the solution.
3.4 SSTCP, TGTCP and OKTCP
A paper [3] published by Intel introduced some interesting techniques focused on TCP ser-
vices concealment. The three proposed approaches were depicted for accessing and securing
TCP services either by changing the connection philosophy (e.g. involve additional packets
4http://www.cipherdyne.org/fwknop/
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for authorization/authentication) or by slightly extend the three-way handshake. The main
objectives included: security by obscurity, lightweight authorization and end-to-end authen-
tication. A description of the three variants follows.
• SSTCP, or Spread-Spectrum TCP, makes use of several TCP SYN segments targeted
for the remote peer, that must be sent before doing the standard three-way handshake.
Within each SYN packet, one specific TCP header field (e.g. ISN or destination port
number) is used to encode a key that is validated at the remote endpoint side. The
name spread-spectrum is a metaphor: in telecommunications a signal is spread trough
several frequencies (e.g. the frequency spectrum), likewise in SSTCP the key is “spread”
throughout several TCP SYN segments. This is in fact very similar to the Port Knock-
ing mechanism, if the destination TCP port number is used to encode the key. As a
drawback, it can be pointed the fact the key is a previous agreed shared key between
both peers. The amount of SYN segments used to encode the authorization key must
also be known by the participating entities beforehand.
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Spread-Spectrum TCP
• TGTCP, or Tailgate TCP, needs an additional packet before the three-way handshake
passes through. That initial packet can be either an UDP datagram or a TCP SYN
segment and it contains a shared key and other data to authorize the connection that
follows. Furthermore, there is also some timing information to restrict replay attacks.
An important drawback can arise from synchronization issues, that is, the authorization
packet can arrive either too early or just too late due to network routing.
• OKTCP, or Option-Keyed TCP, does not need an additional packet to provide the
necessary information to be used for authorization purposes. Instead, it uses either an
IP option (i.e. IP timestamp) or a TCP option (i.e. TCP echo) instead. Both solutions
have one major restriction: the space available to encode a key is very limited.
It must be mentioned that authors point out that the data part of a TCP SYN segment could
eventually be used to transport the key information, either in TGTCP or in OKTCP.
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Figure 3.3: Tailgate TCP (left) and Option-Keyed TCP (right)
3.5 Secure TCP
With the goal of adding security and increased integrity directly to the transport layer, a
mechanism [40] was conceived long time ago for this purpose. Secure TCP, as it was called
then, works by extending the three-way handshake as seen in Fig. 3.4.
In a first phase, the client sends a SYN segment with its own capabilities in terms of
integrity and confidentiality. Later on, the server answers with an “enhanced” SYN+ACK
segment, where it identifies a compatible encryption method that should be used on the fol-
lowing segments along with the server’s public key. The client then replies with its own public
key and session shared keys encrypted with the provided server’s public key. One shared key
is used for integrity while the other one is used for TCP segment encryption during the normal
data exchange, after the connection establishment. The TCP header itself keeps unprotected
for backward compatibility but the TCP body tail contains a MAC (Message Authentication
Code) that allows integrity validation comprising the TCP header and the TCP encrypted
data inside the TCP body part.
Using this solution has its own pitfalls, namely:
• implies that both peers must have valid certificates, which should be signed by the CA
(Certificate Authority) for all IP addresses used by peers on “secure TCP” connections;
• assigns a bit named “TCP options extension” to one of the bits in reserved field of TCP;
• introduces 5 new TCP options, namely “TCP length”, “negotiation send”, “negotiation
reply”, “key exchange send” and “key exchange reply”, although the last four ones are
contained within the TCP data part;
• inhibits the use of cross-active open;
• implicitly implies an additional ACK segment at the end of the connection establishment;
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Figure 3.4: Secure TCP: negotiation data (NEGOx) is initially exchanged, the remote end-
point sends its public key (KEYp) so the local endpoint can afterward send an ACK segment
with session keys (KEYs), protected by the local private key and the remote public key.
These session keys are used for confidentiality and integrity.
3.6 Proposed Internet Draft
A discontinued IETF Internet Draft [41] proposed an extension to support TCP port names.
The main goal of this proposal was to increase the number of concurrent connections for
existing services by decoupling them from fixed port numbers reserved by IANA.
In this proposal, named server ports are somehow resolved by clients, i.e., clients propose
a resolution that is accepted by the server host, if the name exists. In fact, it is not exactly
a resolution since the destination port is not taken into consideration. Thus, a SYN with a
server named port contains also a proposed server port number, and the returned SYN+ACK
returns a name-number acceptance reply. The modified three-way handshake is very similar
to the original one, as shown in Fig. 3.5.
Names are defined within a TCP portname option as described in Table 3.1.
Kind Length Option Data
(1 byte) (1 byte) (portname’s length bytes)
(to be defined) ≥2 UTF-8 portname
Table 3.1: Definition (kind, length and option data) of the TCP portname option suggested
by Dr. Joseph Touch. “Portnames” are limited to UTF-8 strings.
Clients would specify a port name, in the form 〈portname.portnumber〉, sent with the
SYN segment header. One of these fields could be unspecified but the stack would substitute
it either by the associated service name for the given portnumber, or by the port number for
the given service name. Case no IANA “assigned” service name exists for the portnumber,
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“UNKNOWN” would be chosen for portname. A similar concept applies when a portname is
addressed without any specific portnumber, therefore a special predefined port number must
be used to signal “whatever port”.
The suggested behavior for servers was that they would bind to a specific port, like “0”.
This was just a way of informing the TCP stack that incoming connection requests, for the
port name to which the server was bound, should be accepted independently of the destination
port number.
Both source and destination TCP port numbers are randomly generated, meaning that the
destination TCP port number can collide with some service running at the remote endpoint,
if we have present that the server host might not be port name aware. More, in this case
a standard SYN+ACK is returned because the server ignores the unknown TCP portname
option; the client will notice the lack of this option in SYN+ACK and only then the connection
will be aborted by sending a RST to the server. As shown, connections can be half-opened at
the server host due to this, configuring a minimum DoS scenario completely under the control
of the originator - he was the first sending the SYN segment with the TCP portname option
and he is ultimately the last one responsible for aborting the connection.
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Figure 3.5: Joe Touch’s proposed IETF draft (draft-touch-tcp-portnames-00.txt) for TCP port
names. The name goes as a TCP option in the SYN and SYN+ACK acknowledges it, using
the same type of option but with a zero-length portname option. Source (src) and destination
(dst) port numbers are chosen randomly at start.
Port names are UTF-8 strings, not arbitrary data, corresponding to the keywords used
to describe services in IANA’s list of Reserved Ports, which can be rather restricted. They
are exchanged within a TCP header option, which strongly limits their maximum length. As
TCP headers are limited to a maximum of 60 bytes, 20 of them mandatory, TCP options
can only occupy 40 bytes. Moreover, part of these 40 bytes may be occupied by other TCP
options, which further reduces the possible lengths of port names.
29
30
Chapter 4
Architecture
4.1 Simple TCP Name Resolution
As a first approach, a simple TCP name resolution model (SRM)[13] was devised. It is
effectively a name service for TCP ports that enables clients and servers to resolve arbitrary
names (byte arrays) to TCP ports, using the following semantic: strict byte equality between
names.
The advantages of using this name service are twofold: (i) users may discriminate servers
using names instead of numbers and (ii) TCP port scanners, such as nmap, should not be
capable of discovering servers bound to unusual names.
Using names for referring ports provides a more intuitive way to refer TCP services, instead
of numbers. Service names that formerly were bound to static, well-known port numbers may
continue to exist but do not need any more to be bound to the same ports. For instance,
we can bind the names http to port 8080 and http1 to port 80. Clients access either port
specifying their name, http or http1, instead of numbers 8080 and 80. Port names are also
useful for uniform and uniquely tagging ports used by the servers of overlay networks.
Using arbitrary byte arrays to name TCP ports also prevents port scanning tools to discover
listening ports. In fact, the success of port scanners in discovering listening ports bound to
servers is due to the current small domain of port numbers —
[
1, 216 − 1
]
. With arbitrary
port names, we are able to deploy services with unusual, possibly long port names which
cannot be easily found by port scanners. Services with unusual, confidential port names may
be useful in many circumstances requiring restricted access profiles, namely:
• Experimental server deployment in pre-production environments;
• Private service deployment, such as personal content providers (file or web servers, mail
servers);
• Restricted overlay networks.
The screening of listening TCP ports by mapping them to unusual port names is somewhat
similar to the Port Knocking mechanisms [3, 20]. However, Port Knocking is an access control
mechanism that requires a per-host or per-network access key. Instead, in this model it is
only required the knowledge of port names and not any key-based access control mechanisms;
the knowledge of a port name is the key, though weak, to access the service that uses the
port.
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4.1.1 Name binding
This name service allows TCP servers to bind names to listening ports and clients to
use port names when requesting a TCP connection. The port name is associated with the
service/application during the socket binding procedure at the server side. Clients refer the
port name when they specify the TCP address of the server in a socket connection request.
As the main focus in this model is to provide a TCP name service, and not to fully
replace port numbers by port names, port names must always be associated to port numbers.
Therefore, the modified TCP layer on the server side will keep a port number to each local
port name. When a application binds a name to a TCP endpoint (socket), it immediately
gets a number as well. For backward compatibility, applications may specify the port number;
if not specified, the TCP layer allocates a free port number.
For applications binding only names to ports, and not fixed numbers, the TCP layer can
also allocate random port numbers on a per-request basis. The benefits of this protocol
decoupling from fixed port numbers are (i) harder traffic eavesdropping and (ii) increased
number of concurrent connections, as in [41].
Port names are resolved as soon as possible to allow clients and servers to use port numbers
in the normal TCP segment exchanges. Consequently, the name resolution is integrated in the
TCP synchronization phase, where clients and servers exchange initial sequence numbers and
requested/allowed TCP options (see Fig. 4.1). The port name is specified in the SYN request,
the name→number resolution is given in the subsequent SYN+ACK segment. Thereafter, both
peers will always use the server port number in all segments exchanged in the TCP stream.
Stateful firewalls should have no problem managing this, if they’re updated to keep track of
port number/name pairs.
The name resolution works as follows. The server host, when receiving a SYN with a port
name, ignores the destination port number (zero in Fig. 4.1) and looks for a socket in the
LISTEN state bound to that port name. If such a socket is found, a SYN+ACK is sent to the
client containing the name resolution, i.e. port name and number. Otherwise, a RST packet
is sent with the port name, without resolving it.
4.1.2 Backward compatibility
Port name resolutions, expressed in SYN requests, should carry a null server port number
to force a RST reply from standard TCP stacks. Though the TCP standard does not refer
that TCP ports cannot use the number 0, it is not used in practice1; so it can be used as
a mechanism to differentiate old TCP stacks from new ones implementing port names. Port
scrubbers [22] should be updated to include TCP destination port 0 as valid when the port
name option is present.
Port name resolutions are only provided to clients that request a connection to a TCP
endpoint with a port name. Clients using the normal TCP connection request, i.e. using
a server port number, do not get any name resolution when the port number is actually
associated with a name. Likewise, they do not receive a port name in a RST reply. This
is done for two reasons. First, the client did not request a name resolution, so it should
not get one. Second, for backward compatibility with current TCP stacks, clients using the
1IANA currently reserves the use of port 0 mainly for historic reasons, though it can be used to signal a
future expansion of the port numbering space.
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Figure 4.1: Standard three-way handshake, using port numbers x and y (a) and extended
three-way handshake using a server port name (b). The slashed line represents an alternative
server reply (RST segment) when the connection to port y or with the given name is not
possible or allowed.
actual number-based port addressing should observe the standard TCP behavior from servers
(described in Fig. 4.1).
4.1.3 Port names in TCP segments
As above described, port names are only used in the TCP synchronization phase, namely
in SYN, SYN+ACK and RST segments. Thus, we have to conceive a way of adding arbitrary
names to these segments and to signal that they should be used.
As referred in section 3.6, adding names to TCP headers is not a suitable solution, because
it severely limits the length of port names. Instead, we decided to use the TCP payload to
store the port name and to use a new TCP option to signal the presence and the length of
the port name in the beginning of the segment payload.
TCP synchronization segments allow clients and servers to exchange data. Though this
is not supported by the Berkeley sockets API, it is allowed by the XTI (X/Open Transport
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TCP standard TCP with port names
Segment seq ack seq ack
SYN ISNc 0 ISNc 0
RST 0 ISNc+1 0
ISNc+1+
len(name)
SYN+ACK ISNs ISNc+1 ISNs
ISNc+1+
len(name)
ACK ISNc+1 ISNs+1
ISNc+1+ ISNs+1+
len(name) len(name)
Table 4.1: Calculation of sequencing numbers (ack and seq) for the Simple TCP Name Res-
olution model.
Interface) and is a correct behavior according to the standard [28]. RST segments usually do
not carry any data in their payload but a standard amendment [4, §4. 2.2.12] defines that
they may carry a reason message in their payload. Thus, using the payload of synchronization
and reset segments for exchanging port names is correct, according to the standards, though
such data should not be delivered to upper layers.
As port names are transmitted in the segments’ payload, they have a direct effect in the
management of the stream sequence numbers. The sequence and acknowledgement numbers
exist to control the data stream between peers, guaranteeing byte order and resilience to data
loss.
It was decided to keep the semantics of sequence numbers during the synchronization
phase using port names, i.e. names are seen as ordinary data exchanged in payloads (see
Table 4.1), but they are removed from the data that is provided to upper protocol layers.
This does not raise any coherence problem, since upper layers are not aware of sequence
numbers. In other words, upper layers do not notice that the amount of data received in
segments’ payload is not the same amount of data they actually get.
Consequently, whenever a name resolution is required in a SYN segment, its reply, either a
SYN+ACK or a RST segment, acknowledges a sequence number equal to the client’s ISN plus
the port name length plus one. Similarly, the client’s ACK will contain a sequence number
equal to its ISN plus the server’s port name plus one. In this case, the acknowledgement
number equals the server’s ISN plus the port name length plus one.
4.1.4 Managing port access restrictions
The TCP name service prevents services with unusual names to be discovered by port
scanning tools, hiding them from people or tools that wish to exploit and not really use them.
But in 4.1.1 we saw that port names may be associated to fixed numbers bound to listening
ports. Thus, to enforce the name-based access control we need to disallow clients to connect
server ports using only their number.
Consequently, servers must specify, when binding, a name to a listening port, if (i) number-
based connections are permitted or (ii) only name-based connections are allowed. In this last
case, the TCP layer is free to use one random number for the server port per name-based
connection request.
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4.1.5 Caching of name resolutions
Some name services’ clients maintain caches of name resolutions. For instance, this is
common in DNS but not in RPC. It was decided not to maintain caches in the TCP port
name resolutions.
Two main reasons justify this decision. First, name resolutions are piggybacked in the two
first segments of a TCP synchronization, thus the overhead of name resolution is too reduced
to justify the existence and management of caches in clients for increasing performance.
Second, stalled cached resolutions can lead to wrong TCP connections that only applications
can possibly detect, but not the TCP layer itself.
4.1.6 Windowing adjustments
One adjustment needs to be made in the TCP windowing mechanism, so it can deal
with segments that transport data during the three-way handshake. The change concerns the
receive window size. The client defines and advertises this value when starting a connection
while the server’s receive window size is announced in the SYN+ACK segment. In this specific
model, only SYN and SYN+ACK segments contain the port name payload. Therefore, in
order to process the named SYN+ACK the client needs to adjust its receive window to an
appropriate and suitable value (at least the port name length plus TCP header). The server
can apply a similar value to its receive window .
There are some implementation constraints and drawbacks regarding the choice of MSS
as discussed latter on Chapters 5 and 6, respectively.
4.2 Enhanced TCP Name Resolution
SRM may be an interesting model due to its simplicity but that turns out to be its major
disadvantage. The Enhanced TCP Name Resolution (ERM) is an improvement of the previous
model. It works out being a generalization of SRM by removing the strict concept of being
just a mere resolution mechanism. The meaning of port names was also extended to include
semantics. In fact, the concept of a “port name” is overridden when transporting data that
can be used for any purpose (e.g. resolution, validation, authentication). Note, however, that
the key points of SRM are also present or can be addressed by using ERM, specifically the
possibility of using friendly names to tag services and the existence of implicit security by
enforced obscurity (i.e. services are not visible if not properly addressed).
The advantages of using this enhanced model over SRM are:
• totaly decouples the TCP connection establishment from strict TCP port addressing;
• supports other features besides name resolution;
• delegates the connection establishment logic to external processes;
• supports a pluggable logic mechanism closely integrated with the TCP/IP stack.
Standard TCP connections succeed if packets are routed to endpoints with listening TCP
services. With SRM the connection establishment depends on an in-band name resolution,
translating names into port numbers, whereas in ERM connections are established if the logic
implemented in external user processes decides that the three-way handshake should proceed
normally. Ultimately, this scheme resolves a connection request to a listening TCP service
and uses exchanged data (“port names”) to validate the connection establishment.
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A simple name resolution as the one used by SRM does not provide the security that is
demanded for establishing secure and trusted communications, namely through authentication
or authorization techniques; but all this can be achieved using ERM. In fact, port names
exchanged during the three-way handshake may contain encrypted data.
As already mentioned, it is up to specific external processes to decide if the connection
goes through or not. These processes implement some logic based on port names. A Domain
of Interpretation (DOI) corresponds to the definition of a set of rules which allow service
addressing/resolution during the three-way handshake and that may conditionate a successful
connection establishment. Two DOI examples are the exact name match resolution logic or
a name resolution with authentication based in a pre-shared key. The processes responsible
for implementing DOI rules are called DOI Resolvers.
For a successful communication between endpoints, a DOI must have the same meaning
at each endpoint. Therefore, the DOI is identified by a number that must be managed
centrally by some entity, like IANA. Communication attempts between endpoints that do not
understand some DOI would fail.
4.2.1 Name binding and connection establishment
Being a generic mechanism using names to address and validate connections between TCP
endpoints, it makes even more sense to integrate it directly into the TCP synchronization
phase, as presented in the extended three-way handshake of Fig. 4.2.
Similarly to SRM, this name service allows TCP servers to bind names to listening end-
points during the socket binding procedure. Clients do not need to use the same port name as
the one used by the server for name binding, since there is an effective name resolution in the
server. Instead, clients send some port name payload that will be used by the server’s DOI
Resolver to find out, accordingly with that DOI’s logic, the listening endpoint at the server
side. So, the first step here involved is effectively a name resolution. Afterwards, data built
as a port name structure is exchanged in the remaining SYN+ACK and ACK segments. That
data is used to validate the connection to the endpoint that was found in the first step, after
a named SYN request.
The name resolution and connection validation procedures are processed by DOI Resolvers.
These use the information contained within port names to decide if the connection proceeds
or not. For each connection attempt there is not just one decision, there are in fact three,
one after each segment of the three-way handshake. Due to this, besides taking a decision,
a DOI Resolver may need to produce an output that will be transmitted as a port name
in the subsequent segment of the three-way handshake and that will serve as input to the
next decision. One consequence of this interaction between the TCP stack and DOI Resolvers
during the connection establishment phase is that processing of incoming packets must be
asynchronous. During the three-way handshake a segment is handled as usually, typically
by the TCP layer, but since it may interact with a DOI Resolver, its processing has to be
interrupted and suspended until getting an answer from the DOI Resolver. This can impose
some implementation problems, depending on the architecture of the underlying kernel and
TCP stack.
Here port names are always present in the three segments, or in RST, even if their “port
name payload” is empty (i.e. only composed by a port name header). The reason lies in the
generic architecture of this model, whose resolution/validation logic is implemented by DOI
Resolvers. Thus, the TCP stack is not aware of that logic and, as such, it does not know if all
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Figure 4.2: Extended three-way handshake for the Enhanced Resolution Model and its inte-
gration with DOI Resolvers. Each segment has a source and destination TCP port number
src/dst and may have some payload. Communication with DOI Resolvers is made through
resolve(), validate() and revalidate() primitives.
or part of the exchanged port names are used to complete and accept the connection. This
is also the reason why port access restrictions, as the ones depicted in section 5.1.4, do not
make sense in this scenario: servers cannot be addressed by port number.
Port names are actually structures formed by a port name header, used for “addressing”
purposes, and some attached data, as shown in Fig. 4.3. As port numbers are not used to
correlate SYN and SYN+ACK segments, neither their payload through a strict comparison,
as happens with SRM, a port name must contain an identifier that must be preserved across
those segments. In fact, the client chooses an identifier per connection and thereafter that
identifier is used on subsequent named segments. The structure of port names must also
contain a field telling which DOI the port name is related to, so it can be delivered to the
proper DOI Resolver. These two fields, identifier and domain of interpretation, form the
port name header which will be used to correlate named SYN and SYN+ACK segments instead
of just using the mentioned identifier.
Three special names can be observed in Fig. 4.2: names1, names2 and namec. The first
two correspond to a name given to the server endpoint, in the server context, by the local DOI
Resolver and the latter is assigned by the client’s DOI Resolver to the server endpoint. Both are
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Identifier Domain Of Interpretation Port Name Data
←header→ ←data→
Figure 4.3: Structure of port names in the enhanced model context.
optional and therefore not essential in this model; they can be obtained by getsockname() and
getpeername() glibc functions for specific application processing after connection establishment
but are not used to conditionate its own success. The client port name (namec) can be
assigned right after receiving the named SYN+ACK. At the server side it is not so clear when
to assign a port name to its server endpoint. There are two options: (i) after receiving
a successful SYN, with names1, or (ii) after successfully receive the subsequent ACK, with
names2. This decision is taken by the DOI Resolver.
The connection establishment involves DOI Resolvers and works as follows. Initially there
must be a DOI Resolver, responsible for a certain domain of interpretation, running locally
to both endpoints. When the TCP server executes the socket binding procedure, it registers
a name and, eventually a port number. Consequently, the server registers itself in the DOI
through the register() primitive, using the given port name and the the listening TCP port
number as arguments.
A named SYN, with the port name payload referred as name1 and with destination port
number equal to 0, is sent to the server host. This one will invoke the resolve() primitive in
the DOI Resolver, returning name2 to be sent with the SYN+ACK and a resolved port number
corresponding to that service. It may also return names1 to be locally assigned to the server
endpoint or leave that decision to a latter time, when dealing with the client’s named ACK.
The client, upon receiving the named SYN+ACK, will invoke the validate() primitive in its
own resolver. This resolver understands the port name because it handles requests for the
same domain of interpretation as the server’s DOI Resolver does. The validation arguments
include name1, sent with the named SYN, and name2 that is returned in the SYN+ACK.
The client’s DOI Resolver will then return name3 to be sent with the ACK segment and may
return namec to be assigned to the server’s endpoint, in the client’s context. Finally, the
server receives the named ACK and makes a final validation through the revalidate() primitive
on the DOI Resolver. The latter will decide wether the connection establishment should or not
succeed and may also return names2 to be assigned to the server endpoint instead of names1.
This leads to a final standard ACK sent towards the client or eventually a standard RST if
it was decided to abort the connection. The last ACK segment is a natural consequence of
acknowledging data from the previously received named ACK.
When the listening endpoint is terminated, the TCP layer will locally deregister its name
from the DOI Resolver by invoking the unregister() primitive.
4.2.2 Backward compatibility
Legacy hosts must observe the traditional TCP stack behavior. The same principle that
was used for the simple model also applies here: a named RST is sent only for unsuccessful
named SYN connection requests (e.g. due to failed name resolution). The port name used
in the RST does not need any port name data, although it can be used to explain the reset
cause as RFC 1122 [4] suggests.
While SRM allowed legacy connections to be established to named servers, ERM does not
allow it. Therefore, a non-named connection attempt will lead to a standard RST segment.
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TCP standard TCP with port names
Segment seq ack seq ack
SYN ISNc 0 ISNc 0
RST 0 ISNc+1 0
ISNc+1+
len(name1)
SYN+ACK ISNs ISNc+1 ISNs
ISNc+1+
len(name1)
ACK ISNc+1 ISNs+1
ISNc+1+ ISNs+1+
len(name1) len(name2)
2nd ACK N/A N/A
ISNs+1+ ISNc+1+
len(name2) len(name1) + len(name3)
Table 4.2: Calculation of sequencing numbers (ack and seq) for the Enhanced TCP Name
Resolution model.
4.2.3 Port names in TCP segments
Similarly to SRM, in ERM port names are exchanged during the TCP synchronization
phase. Unlike SRM, port names are present in every segment that may be exchanged during
the three-way handshake: SYN, SYN+ACK, ACK and RST segments.
In the current model, every segment has a port name payload, even in the ACK segment.
As mentioned earlier, this data must not be seen by upper protocol layers and should be
removed from receive buffers. Additional data following the port name, should be handled
normally (e.g. a named ACK with some other payload should be treated as a standard ACK
segment with that same payload). In other words, port names should be discarded from
normal data processing.
As happens with SRM, sequence numbers must be correctly updated to handle the trans-
mission of data in the segment’s payload. As shown in Table 4.2, whenever a named con-
nection request is issued through a SYN segment, its reply, either a SYN+ACK or a RST
segment, acknowledges a sequence number equal to the client’s ISN plus the “name1” port
name length plus one, ISNc + 1 + len(name1). This also corresponds to the value used for
the sequence number of the client’s ACK that follows. Its acknowledgement number is equal
to ISNc + 1 + len(name1).
Standard three-way handshakes just use three segments, although if the last ACK has
some payload then the server will consequently acknowledge it, using another ACK. Thus, the
second ACK occurs naturally, it is not required by the name resolution protocol. Its sequence
number equals ISNs +1+ len(name2). This ACK segment acknowledges “name3” sent with
the first ACK, therefore its acknowledgement number is ISNc+1+ len(name1)+ len(name3).
4.2.4 Caching of name resolutions
It is worth remembering that during the three-way handshake segments are correlated
using an identifier inside the port name header. As mentioned earlier, there is no explicit
name resolution. DOI Resolvers can implement more or less complex logic, depending on
implementation. As such, caching does not make any sense in this scenario.
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4.2.5 Windowing adjustments
Some adjustments must be taken in TCP windows for proper functioning. All three-
way handshake related segments, as told before, have port names which may be considerably
large. Therefore, not only the client’s receive window must be big enough but also the server’s
receive window . It was chosen the maximum safe value allowed for the TCP window, as will
be detailed in Chapter 5. The use of the Window Scale option was discarded (i.e. considered
zero) since endpoints may not support it. That way, it was followed the standard approach
of setting a high value for the advertised TCP window. Actually, this will be more than
enough as discussed in Chapter 6. Worth noting is that strictly enforcing a high window
may go against some RFC recommendations [1] and can interfere with congestion avoidance
algorithms.
4.2.6 DOI enabled Resolution Models
The DOI paradigm can be used to provide resolution models with more or less complex
logic for addressing and validation. Some different use cases are here briefly presented.
Addressing by exact name
This use case corresponds to the typical name resolution scenario used by standard name
resolution protocols/systems, where a name is resolved to some sort of address. Transposing
this to TCP means that services can be addressed by a name specified in the connection
request. The resolution consists on finding a TCP endpoint in the server whose assigned
name equals the asked name. SRM does exactly this, but it was built into the TCP stack.
Conceiving a DOI version for this use case is quite simple. It would consist of:
1. defining the DOI logic to:
(a) upon register, record the name used by services during the socket binding procedure;
(b) lookup a service with the same port name data that comes with the named SYN;
(c) if such a service is found then allow the connection to proceed when returning from
resolve;
(d) to acknowledge positively both named SYN+ACK and ACK segments, during vali-
date and revalidate primitives respectively;
2. sending a named SYN with the name of the pretended service.
TCP segment Port Name Data
SYN name
SYN+ACK N/A
ACK N/A
Table 4.3: Content of port name data in the addressing by exact name scenario.
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Addressing by regular expression
In this scenario a service is addressed using a regular expression (regex ). The model is
similar to the previous one just differing on how the service is matched against the given
name.
Consider a set of services providing the same functionality, that are bound to the names
http1, . . . , httpN. A way of providing a very basic form of load-balancing would be to issue
a connection request using the regex “http.*”. A generalization would be a friendly service
addressing (e.g. users wishing to connect to some service would specify some characteristic
about that service, translated in a regex ).
TCP segment Port Name Data
SYN regex
SYN+ACK resolved name
ACK N/A
Table 4.4: Content of port name data in the addressing by regular expression scenario. The
SYN port name data contains a regular expression used to find the correct service in the server
host. The service resolve name is returned in the SYN+ACK.
Another implicit use case would be the addressing of services with multiple versions. If
the name syntax is in the form of servicename.version, then users or entities could specify
the name “xpto.*” to address any version of that service or could instead use “xptoV10” to
address the version 10 of service with the assigned name “xpto”.
The steps to achieve these goals would be:
1. defining the DOI logic to:
(a) upon register, record the name used by services during the socket binding procedure;
(b) lookup a service using the port name data that comes with the named SYN as a
regex ;
(c) if such a service is found then allow the connection to proceed when returning from
resolve, besides returning the resolved name;
(d) to acknowledge positively both named SYN+ACK and ACK segments, during vali-
date and revalidate primitives respectively;
2. sending a named SYN with a name matching the regex request.
Secure access
This use case ensures a secure access to services by enforcing a protected connection estab-
lishment where both endpoints are mutually authenticated. MAC values can be exchanged
consecutively [43] to validate a dialogue, in this case the messages exchanged during the
three-way handshake.
We assume that a shared key k was previously distributed to both endpoints by some out-
of-band process. The shared key is never exchanged between endpoints during the connection
establishment. It will be used by each endpoint to compute a MAC sent in the subsequent
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segment and/or validate a MAC that came in a former segment. Random numbers are
consecutively added to port names and serve as input for the current MAC calculation.
For the following explanation, name1, name2 and name3 refer just to the port name
data, thus port name header is excluded hereafter. The port name data format depends on
the segment exchanged. In a SYN segment it has the 〈name,R1,MACk(name,R1)〉 format,
where R1 is a random number and name is a service given friendly name. The SYN+ACK will
introduce another random number, R2, which together with name1 will be used for posterior
validation. Therefore, the port name data has the 〈R2,MACk(R2,name1 )〉 format. Finally,
the named ACK correlates with the previous segments by also using a random number, R3,
and use it as input for MAC calculation with the previously received port name data. This
port name data follows a 〈R3,MACk(R3,name2 )〉 format.
TCP segment Port Name Data
SYN name1=name,R1,MACk(name,R1)
SYN+ACK name2=R2,MACk(R2,name1)
ACK name3=R3,MACk(R3,name2)
Table 4.5: Content of port name data in the secure access scenario.
In terms of segment processing, the necessary steps here involved are:
1. the client computes a random number R1 and uses the shared key k to compute a MAC
of name and R1; a named SYN is sent with the corresponding port name data;
2. the server validates the received port name data, by replaying the MAC calculation;
3. the server computes a random number R2 and uses the shared key k to compute a MAC
of R2 and name1 ; a named SYN+ACK is sent with the corresponding port name data;
4. the client validates the received port name data, by replaying the MAC calculation;
5. the client computes a random number R3 and uses the shared key k to compute a MAC
of R3 and name2 ; a named ACK is sent with the port name data formed by these values;
6. the server validates the received port name data, by replaying the calculation of the
MAC and replies with a standard ACK if it succeeds;
All port names are calculated using the shared key. As the SYN’s port name is specified
directly by the TCP client application, this may raise a problem concerning where k effec-
tively resides (DOI Resolvers vs. client/server applications).
Two solutions are possible to make DOI Resolvers aware of the shared key k :
1. have a specific DOI for each possible shared key;
2. make the client register a port name for itself containing k that would have to be
passed in the validate primitive as another argument. Similarly, during the name binding
procedure in the server, the bound name would have to contain k.
42
Key distribution
This use case uses the asymmetric Diffie-Hellman [9] key agreement protocol to generate
a shared key to be used between both endpoints. The key can be obtained by applications
for whatever purpose (e.g. traffic confidentiality).
The port name data format depends on the segment exchanged. In the SYN segment it
corresponds to a friendly name that is going to be used to find the appropriate service during
name resolution. The server will send a SYN+ACK with a port name data YS = α
s mod q,
where q is a sufficiently large prime number, α is a primitive element of GF(q) and s is a
server generated random number such as 1 ≤ s ≤ q−1. Upon receiving SYN+ACK, the client
can obtain a shared session key k = Y cS mod q, where c is a client generated random number
such as 1 ≤ c ≤ q − 1. Then the client sends an ACK whose port name data YC = α
c mod q.
Finally, the server obtains the shared key k = Y sC mod q.
TCP segment Port Name Data
SYN name
SYN+ACK YS = α
s mod q
ACK YC = α
c mod q
Table 4.6: Content of port name data in the key distribution scenario.
What is assumed is that both endpoints know α and q, which can be public without any
security concern. The port name data (e.g. YC ,YS) may have a length of 128 bytes, assuming
a prime number q of 1024 bits.
The shared key k corresponds to namec and names2 obtainable using getpeername() and
getsockname() functions on client and server endpoints, respectively.
The described use case considers independent DOI Resolvers, i.e. distinct processes from
client and server applications. However, there is no reason that limits the DOI Resolver to be
built into the client/server applications themselves. Considering such a scenario, the model
could be slightly modified. The YC value may be immediately calculated and sent in the
SYN and thus the client may obtain the shared key k when receiving the SYN+ACK segment.
Similarly, the server obtains k upon reception of the named SYN.
Considering a key distribution scenario where DOI Resolvers are built into applications, the
content of port name data for the three-way handshake segments could be the one depicted
in Table 4.7. In this case, the server obtains the shared key from names1.
TCP segment Port Name Data
SYN name,YC YC = α
c mod q
SYN+ACK YS YS = α
s mod q
ACK N/A
Table 4.7: Content of port name data in the key distribution scenario with the DOI Resolver
functionality implemented directly by the TCP client and server.
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Chapter 5
Implementation
Our TCP name service was implemented in one of the latest versions of the Linux kernel
(2.6.22.9), using a Fedora 7 kernel source package (kernel-2.6.22.9-91.fc7.src.rpm) as basis. In
this chapter we will briefly describe the major kernel modifications, introduced in the TCP
stack, to support the proposed name service.
In Linux there are two separate TCP implementations, one for IPv4 and other for IPv6.
Since our implementation is mainly a proof of concept, we only updated the TCP version for
IPv4. Nevertheless, we took into consideration some IPv6 issues, as for the naming of TCP
endpoints, described in section 5.1.5.
5.1 Simple TCP Name Resolution
5.1.1 Socket related structures
Port names, either bound to local ports or to be resolved within TCP connection hand-
shakes, are stored in memory areas dynamically allocated in kernel space. The structures that
store port numbers, inet sock and tcp sock, were updated to include an optional port name,
i.e. a pointer to one of those memory areas and the length of the name; tcp sock includes also
port access restrictions.
Some auxiliary structures, tcp request sock and tcp options received, were also enriched
to maintain the length of the port name. This value simplifies the calculation of sequence
numbers in TCP segments containing port names and helps locating the socket structure in
hashed lists (see section 5.1.3).
5.1.2 Name→number mappings
Since port names are just a step towards port numbers, some mapping table converting
names to numbers must exist. This mapping only applies for local ports, as no caching
of remote name-number bindings is required. We implemented this mapping by extending
the inet hashinfo structure to include an hashed variable based on a new structure named
portname hashbucket as follows.
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struct portname_hashbucket {
spinlock_t lock;
struct list_head list;
unsigned short port;
char * portname;
unsigned short int portname_len;
};
An element is first added to this hashed variable when a socket is bound to a port name,
in inet bind. This is implemented by a new function, inet bind hash portname, which extends
the functionality of inet bind hash. An element is removed from the hashed variable when the
socket referring it is eliminated in inet unhash.
This hash variable is used for name lookup in two different occasions: (i) when binding a
name to a port, in inet csk get port, to check if the name is not already being used, and (ii) in
inet lookup listener, to obtain the port number of the listening socket upon receiving a SYN
segment with a port name.
5.1.3 Socket hashed lists
Linux implements several hashed lists to index sockets. One of them is listening hash,
containing INET LHTABLE SIZE lists of sockets involved in TCP connections. The actual list of
a socket is given by the functions inet ehashfn and inet sk ehashfn, which produce an integer
from the source/destination addresses and port numbers. Thus, both local and remote port
numbers are crucial for indexing sockets in listening hash.
However, clients using name-based connections raise a problem: they do not have a remote
port number when adding a socket in the SYN SENT state, i.e. after sending a SYN segment
with a port name. Thus, for these client sockets there is a temporary hashing within listen-
ing hash until getting the name resolution. This temporary hashing applies only to sockets
in the SYN SENT state; after getting a correct SYN+ACK segment with the required name
resolution, the remote port is used to relocate the socket, now in the ESTABLISHED state.
For the temporary hashing we used the same functions and replaced the server port
number by the port name length. We could as well have used a null server port number but
using the name length is more likely to improve, with no extra costs, the spreading of sockets
(only in the SYN SENT state) among the hashed lists when many port names are used.
5.1.4 Defining port access restrictions
Implementing TCP port access restrictions is accomplished by setting a new, TCP level
socket option. We named this option TCP BIND PORTNAME and gave it the value 15, which is
unallocated. There are three different listening modes that can be set through this option,
though the first one does not apply to port name binding:
• 0 → port number only (current standard);
• 1 → port name only: legacy connection requests to the related port number are not
allowed;
• 2 → port number and port name: both legacy and name-based SYN requests are ac-
cepted.
This socket option is checked in the tcp v4 rcv function, upon the arrival of a SYN segment.
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Kind Length Option Data
(1 byte) (1 byte) (2 bytes)
0x45 4 · · ·
Table 5.1: Definition (kind, length and option data) of the “Port Name” TCP option.
5.1.5 Using TCP port names
For binding names to TCP ports and to express port names when connecting to them, we
created two new structures by extending sockaddr in and sockaddr in6 structures, for IPv4
and IPv6, respectively. The new types were created by adding two extra fields: a pointer to
the port name and the port name length, as shown on the data structures here presented.
struct sockaddr_in_named {
sa_family_t sin_family; /* AF_INET_NAMED */
in_port_t sin_port; /* port number */
struct in_addr sin_addr; /* IP address */
unsigned char sin_zero[2];
uint16_t sin_portname_len; /* Port name length */
char __user *sin_portname; /* Pointer to port name */
};
struct sockaddr_in6_named {
sa_family_t sin6_family; /* AF_INET6 */
in_port_t sin6_port; /* port number */
uint32_t sin6_flowinfo; /* flow information */
struct in6_addr sin6_addr; /* IPv6 address */
uint32_t sin6_scope_id; /* Scope ID */
uint16_t sin6_portname_len; /* Port name length */
char __user *sin6_portname; /* Pointer to port name */
};
Furthermore, two new address families were created for using with these new structures:
AF INET NAMED for IPv4 and AF INET6 NAMED for IPv6. Note that at kernel level these new
address families are used solely for identifying the type of naming structures provided by
client applications. For all other family tagging requirements, it continues to use the constants
AF INET and AF INET6.
The function inet bind was extended to support binding to a local port name. Similarly,
the functions tcp connect and tcp v4 connect were likewise extended to support the connection
to named ports.
5.1.6 Port names in TCP segments
When a client application issues a connection request using a port name, the local TCP
stack copies the port name from the sin portname field of the provided sockaddr in named
structure and updates internal variables as needed. The kernel will then send a SYN packet
with the port name in the payload and a TCP option indicating the length of the port name,
which corresponds to the given sin portname len.
We used the value 0x45 to define a new TCP option, TCPOPT PORTNAME, which uses a 16-bit
integer to describe a port name length.
As the Linux TCP stack does not handle the exchange of user data in synchronization seg-
ments, no modifications were required to prevent port names exchanged in SYN and SYN+ACK
segments to be delivered as normal data to applications. Only port names in RST segments
had to be removed from the data provided as reset reason.
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Linux has one special socket tcp socket that is only used for sending RST segments by
the function tcp v4 send reset. This function and another one, ip send reply, that it calls to
generate the actual RST IP datagram, were extended to process further parameters, namely
port names, and to handle port names in TCP segments.
5.1.7 IP fragmentation
The Linux TCP implementation sets the Don’t Fragment IP flag in TCP segments not
containing payload, such as SYN and SYN+ACK, which is a correct behavior [27] since their
packet length is bellow the fragmentation threshold of 68 bytes. But with our port name
resolution their payload contains a (possibly large) port name, thus fragmentation must be
allowed in those cases. The function tcp transmit skb was modified, when calling ip queue xmit,
to allow IP fragmentation for these synchronization segments whenever their size surpasses
the fragmentation threshold.
5.1.8 Summary of source code changes
The main changes and enhancements were the following:
• create and use an hash to map port names into port numbers;
• extend internal structures and functions to support port name data;
• change some function definitions to pass and deal with more arguments;
• create a few auxiliary functions to more easily deal with port names.
A detailed description of changes made within each kernel file can be found in Appendix A.
5.2 Enhanced TCP Name Resolution
5.2.1 DOI integration
In this model the TCP stack interacts closely with DOI Resolvers for assistance on name
resolution. While on Linux the first runs on kernel (memory) space, DOI Resolvers run on user
space as user processes. A DOI interface kernel module, described later in section 5.2.6, acts as
a mediator between those two distinct areas, as shown in Fig. 5.1.
The kernel↔DOI communication occurs by means of a protocol based on Netlink sockets,
properly detailed in section 5.2.8. The advantages of using a kernel module (LKM) are
inherent to the modular concept itself and to the built-in logic. Therefore, a LKM can
provide:
• a pluggable mechanism by means of dynamic (un)loading;
• a fault-tolerant architecture capable of handling problems with DOI Resolvers, such as
crashes;
• an efficient, reliable and buffered asynchronous protocol using Netlink sockets.
A successful enhanced three-way handshake using this approach is seen in Fig. 5.2 along
with the entities that take part in the process of connection establishment.
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Figure 5.1: Layered hierarchy (kernel↪→DOI interface kernel module↪→DOI resolvers) involved
in the interaction between the Linux kernel and DOI resolvers.
Figure 5.2: An implementation of ERM with the three-way handshake segments interacting
with DOI Resolvers through a DOI interface kernel module.
5.2.2 Socket structures and port names
The structure that stores information of INET sockets,inet sock, was updated to include
more port name related variables, namely resolved portname, acked portname, client portname,
server portname which correspond to the name2, name3, namec and names1/names2 on
Fig. 4.2, respectively. Their lengths were also included. These port names are intended
to store temporary information used during packet processing. The port access restrictions
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defined in tcp sock, though meaningless in this model as mentioned before, were kept.
The structure request sock ops had to be slightly modified for adding support for port
name parameters in the send reset declaration. The reason for this lies in the need for sending
RST segments using the request socket1 in the asynchronous packet handling.
The purpose of the names assigned to client/server endpoints, namec and names1/names2
respectively, may concern some application logic derived from the output of DOI Resolvers;
they do not influence the decision logic of the connection establishment. These names can
be obtained by using the getsockname() and getpeername() functions from glibc. Both will
lead to the execution of the same inet getname function on kernel side, though. Backward
compatibility must be preserved in the glibc API and yet allow it to return a different, named
socket address when requested. By improving the semantic of glibc functions, it is possible
to distinguish which type of address should be returned. This is accomplished using the
namelen (a pointer to an integer) input argument of those functions with different values:
either the size of sockaddr in or else the size of sockaddr in named, for IPv4. Inside the kernel,
inet getname is improved to take this into consideration.
5.2.3 Name→number mappings
It must stay clear that the model does not delegate all TCP rules to DOI Resolvers. Looking
at the general TCP philosophy, we can conceive two components: (i) service allocation and
(ii) name resolution and validation procedures. The first is dealt inside the server side Linux
kernel and consists on allocating several resources including an address: a port number that
cannot conflict with another (validated in inet csk get port). The latter is handled by DOI
Resolvers on both hosts. Therefore, except minor semantic changes, the same mechanism
is applied as in section 5.1.2. A consequence is that using the same port name will, for all
purposes, be considered as binding exactly the same service, leading to a failure when multiple
instances make use of it.
5.2.4 Port names in TCP segments
Each client will use a different identifier for each connection. An integer is incremented in
the modified tcp v4 connect function and becomes part of the port name. As this identifier is
used to correlate SYN and SYN+ACK segments, instead of the destination port number, 32 bit
were allocated for this purpose which should be enough for dealing with multiple connection
attempts from the same endpoint. Port names are actually structures with a special semantic
identified by the associated DOI. It was considered a maximum of 256 different semantics.
The definition of the enhanced port name structure and an example are shown in Table 5.2.
id doi portname data
(4 bytes) (1 byte) (x bytes)
0x00000001 0x00 F0306A· · ·
Table 5.2: Definition (id, doi and portname data) of port names in the enhanced model
context, followed by an example.
1A temporary socket used before establishing the connection to act on the connection request
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Although the Linux TCP stack does not handle the exchange of user data in SYN and
SYN+ACK synchronization segments, data in a named ACK after a SYN+ACK will be pro-
cessed as standard payload. This was confirmed to happen both in MS Windows and Linux
based operating systems. As it is mandatory to prevent port names from reaching upper
layers, tcp data queue was modified to ignore the port name payload on named ACK segments.
5.2.5 Major kernel changes
The main changes and enhancements implemented in the Linux kernel involved:
• making the processing of three-way handshake segments asynchronous;
• changing some function definitions to pass and deal with more arguments;
• creating auxiliary functions, some for asynchronous handling and other to interact with
DOI.
A detailed description of changes made within each kernel file can be found in Appendix D;
some are worth mentioning, though.
The kernel routines local bh disable and local bh enable are used to disable and enable soft-
ware interrupts on the local CPU, respectively. The functions bh lock sock/bh lock sock nested
and bh unlock sock serve to hold or release a lock on the socket. This lock is used to avoid
changes in the state of the socket, due to incoming packets, interrupts or any handler. All of
them are important and must be considered when the processing of a segment is broken due
to interaction with DOIs.
Whenever a SYN segment is received, tcp v4 rcv is interrupted and tcp prot.resolve portname
is invoked in order to send a resolution request to the appropriate DOI Resolver. When
the resolution comes, the tcp async synack continues the remaining segment processing. The
standard SYN+ACK segment handling is interrupted in tcp rcv synsent state process which then
invokes tcp prot.validate portname to send the validation request to the associated DOI. Its reply
will invoke the kernel code of tcp async ack that will either send a named ACK or an RST.
The named ACK segment will in turn be revalidated by the server when tcp v4 do rcv invokes
tcp check req lite (a simplified “clone” of tcp check req) that calls the tcp prot.validate portname
function defined within the DOI interface kernel module.
A subtle difference to SRM concerns the hashing algorithm that calculates the index used
by socket hashed lists. In ERM the length of the port name was not considered since port
names in named SYN and SYN+ACK segments are not the same anymore. Instead, function
inet ehashfn was modified to use the port name’s identifier field (id).
Concerning TCP windowing, the Linux kernel source code states that some endpoints
have problems whenever TCP windows superior to 32767 are used (no scaling). Therefore,
MAX TCP WINDOW is defined with this value. Even if 32767 is less than the 65535 allowed
window size, besides being enough it is also a safe value that can and was chosen to be
advertised by both endpoints, without needing any window scale.
5.2.6 DOI interface kernel module
As soon as the DOI interface kernel module (DOI LKM is loaded, an initialization function
is invoked, as shown in code snippet 1. The module starts by invoking netlink register notifier
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which registers a notifier to handle asynchronous Netlink events (in this case it just ignores
them).
Afterwards, it creates a Netlink socket through netlink kernel create. Several parameters
must be passed, though. One of them is the protocol type, an integer that indicates a kind of
channel to be used for some specific purpose (e.g. routing table and firewall manipulation),
between kernel and user processes. For this work, it was used the NETLINK TEST macro, with
the assigned and unallocated value 17, to distinguish the proposed protocol for DOI message
exchanges. Another input parameter is a pointer to a function responsible for asynchronously
handling the incoming Netlink datagrams, nl data ready more precisely.
Next, some linked lists are initialized, like doihash which contains the PID2 of the user
process for every registered DOI Resolver.
Finally, the module must somehow couple with the TCP stack and present the new avail-
able features. This is done by dynamically redefining some static variables inside the ker-
nel. These variables are in fact function pointers, which point to NULL by default. As an
example, the expression “tcp prot.register portname=register portname” substitutes the reg-
ister portname in the tcp prot kernel structure with a pointer to the register portname defined
locally inside the module.
When the module unloads, a similar process is done but in the reverse way. Note that the
module sends a protocol message to all registered DOI Resolvers informing them of this event,
a sort of graceful close (see code snippet 2).
Incoming packets are handled asynchronously, as mentioned earlier. Part of that process-
ing is shown in code snippet 3. Basically, the datagram is copied into a sk buff structure, its
message type is analyzed accordingly with the DOI protocol messages and interpreted corre-
spondingly. In the source code, it is visible part of the procedure that occurs when a DOI
Resolver registers with the kernel module. The work flow for this use case is summarized as
follows:
1. a datagram is received and copied into some reserved space;
2. the message type is analyzed;
3. the DOI’s identifier (doi) is validated to check if no other DOI Resolver is already re-
sponsible for that ID (not shown);
4. a positive or negative acknowledgment is sent back to the DOI Resolver candidate;
5. in case of success, the module informs the DOI Resolver of all registered TCP endpoints
for that domain of interpretation, if any.
One of the important features that permits some fault-tolerance is precisely the last point.
If for some reason the DOI Resolver disappears and comes back online, there is no incoherence
in the list of listening endpoints between the TCP stack and the DOI Resolver.
For every kernel “broken packet handling” or initiated interaction there must be its module
counterpart, implemented as module functions. The list of kernel functions overridden by the
kernel module are namely:
register portname Registers a port name within the DOI. It is called whenever a TCP
service starts listening; the DOI LKM will send a registration request to the appropriate
2Process ID
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Code Snippet 1 DOI LKM initialization function used upon module loading.
static int __init my_module_init(void)
{
int error;
error = netlink_register_notifier(&netlink_notifier);
if (error){
printk(KERN_ERR "%s: register of event notifier failed: %d\n",
__FUNCTION__,error);
return(1);
}
nl_sk = netlink_kernel_create(NETLINK_TEST, 0,
nl_data_ready, NULL, THIS_MODULE);
if (!nl_sk) {
printk(KERN_ERR
"netlink_test: unable to create netlink socket!\n");
return(1);
}
printk(KERN_INFO "netlink_test: initializing DOIHASH...\n");
doihash=kmalloc(sizeof(struct doihash_element),GFP_KERNEL);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&doihash->list);
...
tcp_prot.register_portname=register_portname;
tcp_prot.unregister_portname=unregister_portname;
tcp_prot.resolve_portname=resolve_portname;
tcp_prot.validate_portname=validate_portname;
tcp_prot.revalidate_portname=revalidate_portname;
return 0;
}
DOI Resolver; A pointer to the listening socket and the corresponding listening TCP
port are also passed as arguments (their use depends on the DOI logic);
unregister portname Similar to register portname with two exceptions: (i) it is invoked
when the socket is destroyed (in tcp unhash) and (ii) the message sent to the DOI Resolver
corresponds to a deregistration;
resolve portname Resolves an incoming connection request, when a SYN is received, during
the three-way handshake. Arguments include the destination IP address and TCP port
along with a pointer for the packet saved within the sk buff structure. The latter will
be used to distinguish and ignore duplicate requests coming from the kernel;
validate portname Validates, in the client side, the “resolution” returned with SYN+ACK
during the three-way handshake. Its arguments include the original, unresolved port
name sent with the SYN and the resolved port name returned with the SYN+ACK.
revalidate portname Re-validates, in the server side, the “resolution” returned with ACK
segment during the three-way handshake.
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Code Snippet 2 DOI LKM function used upon module unloading.
static void __exit my_module_exit(void)
{
struct list_head *pos, *q;
struct doihash_element *tmp;
list_for_each_safe(pos,q,&(doihash->list)){
tmp=list_entry(pos,struct doihash_element,list);
printk(KERN_INFO "SF: freeing (doi=%i,pid=%hu)\n",
tmp->doi,tmp->pid);
send_doi_msg(nl_sk,tmp->pid,++request_id,
DOI_MSG_TYPE_UNREGISTER_OK,0,NULL);
list_del(pos);
kfree(tmp);
}
...
tcp_prot.register_portname=NULL;
tcp_prot.unregister_portname=NULL;
tcp_prot.resolve_portname=NULL;
tcp_prot.validate_portname=NULL;
tcp_prot.revalidate_portname=NULL;
if ((nl_sk) && (nl_sk->sk_socket)){
sock_release(nl_sk->sk_socket);
netlink_unregister_notifier(&netlink_notifier);
}
}
Worth mentioning is that these functions do not return any data, since they are asyn-
chronous. The “responses”, or resolutions, are sent by DOI Resolvers using the DOI protocol
(see section 5.2.8). Then, they are interpreted by the DOI LKM and a kernel function is
asynchronously invoked finishing up the packet processing, that started with the resolution
request but had to be broken due to the DOI mechanism. The kernel functions called from
within the LKM, upon resolution request reception, are:
tcp async synack Continues the processing of an incoming SYN. Called in response to
resolve portname;
tcp async ack Continues the processing of an incoming SYN+ACK. Called in response to
validate portname;
tcp async ackchk Continues the processing of an incoming ACK during the three-way hand-
shake. Called in response to revalidate portname;
5.2.7 DOI Resolvers
The functionalities of two different DOI Resolvers were implemented in C language, within
the same program named doi example. The structure of the DOI Resolvers is basically the
same so a simple command line argument can be used in order to select either model. Besides
choosing which resolver to use, it is possible to change (see Listing 5.1) some parameters or
even force in some way the behavior of the resolver.
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Code Snippet 3 DOI LKM handling procedure for incoming Netlink datagrams.
static void nl_data_ready (struct sock *sk, int len)
{
...
receive_doi_msg(nl_sk,&skb,&err);
if (nlh->nlmsg_type==DOI_MSG_TYPE_REGISTER){
struct doihash_element *node=kmalloc(sizeof(struct doihash_element),
GFP_ATOMIC);
node->doi=doi;
node->pid=pid;
list_add(&(node->list),&(doihash->list));
send_doi_msg(nl_sk,pid,id,DOI_MSG_TYPE_REGISTER_OK,0,NULL);
struct regnamehash_element *riter;
struct doi_msg_register_portname rp;
list_for_each_entry(riter,&(regnamehash->list),list){
if (riter->doi==doi){
rp.resolved_port=riter->resolved_port;
rp.resolved_portname_len=riter->resolved_portname_len;
send_doi_msg_with_header(nl_sk,pid,++request_id,
DOI_MSG_TYPE_REGISTER_PORTNAME,
sizeof(struct doi_msg_register_portname),&rp,
riter->resolved_portname_len,riter->resolved_portname);
}
}
...

Syntax:
−m : use Exact Match DOI resolver;
−e : use Regex DOI resolver;
−s : force SYNACK resolve failure upon receiving a named SYN;
−a : force ACK validation failure upon receiving a named SYNACK;
−c : force ACK revalidation failure upon receiving a named ACK;
−d doi : DOI integer identifier − ”doi”;
−i : startup id used for the Netlink DOI protocol’s registration message;
−x name : forced port name data sent in a named SYN − ”resolved portname”;
−y name : forced port name data sent in a named SYN/ACK − ”acked portname”;

 
Listing 5.1: DOI Resolver command line options - syntax and description
A DOI Resolver behaves like a server, so it processes requests and sends the results back
to the client which in this case is the kernel module. The first consequence is that the DOI
Resolver can be stopped at any time, so there must be some way to provide this feature. As
code snippet 4 shows, during the startup of the program a signal hander is defined for SIGINT,
the signal that corresponds to an interrupt from keyboard (e.g. CTRL+C). The handler just
changes a global control variable, which is not just enough because the program can and
certainly will be blocked on some system call (e.g. waiting for incoming data). This can be
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changed, though; through sigaction it’s possible to modify the behavior of the signal handling
whenever a signal is received on current blocked system calls initiated by that process. The
flag SA RESTART, if disabled, can make systems calls abort and set the errno global variable
with the value EINTR.
The next step consists on sending the registration message to the kernel module using the
Netlink socket, created at the program beginning.
Code Snippet 4 DOI Resolver initialization detail.
void leave(int sig){
printf("received SIGINT signal...\n");
out=1;
}
void main(int argc,char *argv[]) {
while ((c = getopt (argc, argv, "mesacx:y:")) != -1)
switch (c){
...
sock_fd = socket(PF_NETLINK, SOCK_RAW,NETLINK_TEST);
(void) signal(SIGINT,leave); // an INTERRUPT signal is dealt by leave()
struct sigaction oldact;
int ret=sigaction(SIGINT, NULL,&oldact);
// abort running system calls if a signal is received
oldact.sa_flags&= ~SA_RESTART;
ret=sigaction(SIGINT, &oldact,NULL);
// register this DOI resolver in the kernel module
send_doi_msg(sock_fd,pid,id++,doi,DOI_MSG_TYPE_REGISTER,0,NULL);
...
The resolver life cycle consists of consecutively answer to requests coming out from the
kernel, through the module. This translates to a loop like the one presented in code snip-
pet 5. Every cycle starts by being “blocked” on a instruction that sits waiting to receive
a datagram from the LKM. Data is read onto an iovec structure that contains the Netlink
header along with the DOI message. After finding out the DOI protocol’s message type, it
can be processed. In the given example, after receiving the port name registration message
(DOI MSG TYPE REGISTER PORTNAME message type) the DOI Resolver will add the
port name to a linked list of registered port names, which in the end correspond to a list of
running TCP services.
The resolution request procedures are depicted on code snippet 6. The list of registered
names must be iterated in order to find, if any, the pretended one. This logic is not mandatory,
it was a decision taken given the two DOI Resolver models implemented. If some kind of
hashing code was implemented and the port name contained that info, then the name lookup
could be more direct and efficient. Anyway, each registered name is “compared” against the
SYN connection request’s port name (name1 ). In the example this is accomplished by match
function. Finally, an answer is built with the hopefully resolved port name and sent back to
the kernel module.
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Code Snippet 5 DOI Resolver processing loop.
while(!out){
int received_bytes=0;
do{
received_bytes=receive_doi_msg_flags(sock_fd,&msg,MSG_WAITALL);
} while ((((received_bytes<=0) && (errno!=EINTR)) || (errno==EAGAIN))
&& (!out));
if ((out) || (errno==EINTR)){ // if aborted
break;
}
nlh=((struct iovec *)(msg.msg_iov))->iov_base;
unsigned int request_id = ((struct doi_msghdr *)NLMSG_DATA(nlh))->id;
unsigned char msg_type = nlh->nlmsg_type;
switch(msg_type){
case DOI_MSG_TYPE_REGISTER_PORTNAME:
struct doi_msg_register_portname *rp=NLMSG_DATA(nlh)+
sizeof(struct doi_msghdr);
portname=NLMSG_DATA(nlh)+sizeof(struct doi_msghdr)+
sizeof(struct doi_msg_register_portname);
void *portnameptr=malloc(rp->resolved_portname_len);
memcpy(portnameptr, NLMSG_DATA(nlh)+sizeof(struct doi_msghdr)+
sizeof(struct doi_msg_register_portname), rp->resolved_portname_len);
/* add listening socket to list */
append(&blist, rp->resolved_port, rp->resolved_portname_len,
portnameptr);
break;
...
Exact Match DOI Resolver
The exact match DOI Resolver is similar to the Simple TCP name resolver, in the way
that the concept behind it is the same. A client connects and proposes a name sent within
the TCP port name option. The server side DOI Resolver, for the domain specified in the
request, “iterates all registered TCP names” and tries to make an exact match with the port
name they registered upon the socket binding procedure. As the equality match is in fact a
byte equality, the memcmp function is used to make the comparison. The name resolution is
rather simple, as code snippet 7 shows.
Since this model is an exact match resolver, the resolved port name and the name proposed
in the SYN are effectively the same. Therefore, the SYN+ACK segment does not need to
transport the resolved name. The named SYN+ACK and ACK segments must transport the
port name header, so they are delivered to the right DOI for finishing up the name handling.
REGEX DOI Resolver
The REGEX DOI Resolver is a possible evolution of the previous DOI Resolver. Instead
of doing a byte equality comparison, this resolver uses a regular expression specified in the
SYN’s port name name1. So, a service is found if its registered name matches the given regular
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Code Snippet 6 DOI Resolver resolve port name request handling.
...
struct doi_msg_resolve_answer ans;
found=0;
list_for_each_entry(iter,&blist.list,list) { // iterates list
if (using_exact){
if ( exactmatch(iter->resolved_portname+sizeof(struct portnamehdr),
portname+sizeof(struct portnamehdr),iter->resolved_portname_len,
portname_len) ){
found=1;
break;
}
} else if (using_regex){
if ( regexmatch(iter->resolved_portname+sizeof(struct portnamehdr),
portname+sizeof(struct portnamehdr)) ){
found=1;
break;
}
}
}
if (found){
// force the same ID, so the kernel can correlate requests
((struct portnamehdr *)iter->resolved_portname)->id = \
((struct portnamehdr *)portname)->id;
// build answer message
ans.resolved_port=iter->resolved_port;
ans.resolved_portname=iter->resolved_portname;
ans.resolved_portname_len=iter->resolved_portname_len;
} else {
ans.resolved_port=0;
ans.resolved_portname=NULL;
ans.resolved_portname_len=0;
}
send_doi_msg(sock_fd,pid,request_id,doi,
DOI_MSG_TYPE_RESOLVE_ANSWER,sizeof(struct doi_msg_resolve_answer),&ans);
...
expression The matching function is seen in code snippet 7. GNU C library, glibc3, comes
with standard Linux distributions and supports the POSIX.2 interface, namely the POSIX
regular expression compilation. Therefore, for simpleness, this library’s functions were used
although other alternatives exist such as PCRE4 for a Perl 5 regular expression like syntax.
The model here presented resolves the proposed textual port name to some other name.
It might make sense to return the resolved name in this specific scenario. As such, the named
SYN+ACK segment contains the TCP port name option with the resolved port name. On
response, the client issues an ACK segment which transports only the port name header, with
the correct id and DOI identifier - doi.
3http://www.gnu.org/software/libc/
4http://www.pcre.org
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Code Snippet 7 Function used to resolve the name in the Exact Match DOI Resolver.
int exactmatch( char *name1, char *name2, unsigned short int len1,
unsigned short int len2) {
if((len1!=len2) || (memcmp(name1,name2,len1)!=0)) {
return 0;
} else {
return (1 && !force_synack_reject);
}
}
Code Snippet 8 Function used to resolve the name in the REGEX DOI Resolver.
int regexmatch(const char *string, char *pattern) {
int status;
regex_t re;
if(regcomp(&re, pattern, REG_EXTENDED|REG_NOSUB) != 0)
return 0;
status = regexec(&re, string, (size_t)0, NULL, 0);
regfree(&re);
if(status != 0)
return 0;
return (1 && !force_synack_reject);
}
5.2.8 DOI Protocol
The DOI protocol allows data transactions between the TCP stack, running in kernel space,
and the DOI Resolvers, running on user space. The requisites for a DOI protocol are:
1. having an efficient kernel space ↔ user space protocol;
2. providing a mechanism for asynchronous messages (connectionless protocol);
3. being a reliable protocol;
4. supporting addressing features;
5. supporting buffered, queued messages.
There are several alternatives for kernel space ↔ user space communication.
System calls provide a standard interface to access kernel functions but adding a new
one breaks portability and introduces security concerns.
Another option could be using ioctl or sysctl interfaces. The ioctl function executes
commands on opened file descriptors (i.e. stream devices) while sysctl permits reading or
realtime adjustments on system’s internal parameters.
Linux also supports the /proc, or the more recent /sys, virtual file system (VFS). The
set of directories and files stored within this FS5 map to a kernel view of the system, where
5File System
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each device, driver or some parameter is seen as some file(s) in a tree like hierarchy. In a
kernel module it’s possible to add entries to that VFS and to handle operations for that files,
like read/write. Although interesting, because it allows an almost transparent way for user
processes to interact with the kernel, it completely lacks addressing and it has no decent
security, except the one provided by the filesystem itself.
Netlink [35] is a kernel↔user level communication protocol that uses the socket metaphor
to provide an asynchronous API, for connectionless data exchange. Besides unicast, that
uses PID’s as addresses, Netlink also supports multicast using a 32 bit mask to choose the
destination multicast groups. There are API’s to ease the kernel side but also the user side
implementations, even if they are a bit different.
The developed protocol is based in Netlink sockets, since it fulfills the initial requisites
and resembles a typical communication protocol. The Netlink addressing scheme considered
is unicast, because datagrams are sent from the LKM to a specific DOI Resolver and from each
DOI Resolver to the LKM, in the opposite direction. The destination address is defined as a
sockaddr nl structure where the nl pid specifies the destination address. When the datagram’s
destination is the kernel, the PID must be equal to “0”. If it is the DOI Resolver then it must
have the value of its PID. The multicast group defined by nl groups, given the fact that it is
not used, must be zero in either direction.
struct sockaddr_nl
{
sa_family_t nl_family; /* AF_NETLINK */
unsigned short nl_pad; /* zero */
__u32 nl_pid; /* process PID */
__u32 nl_groups; /* multicast groups mask */
} nladdr;
Messages exchanged using Netlink must be preceded by a nlmsghdr header. The nlmsg len
defines the total length of the packet, whose payload size is fixed and defined by a global
variable MAX PAYLOAD equal to 1024 (bytes). The nlmsg type and nlmsg seq exist to help
and be used directly by the “Netlink protocols” themselves. The DOI protocol has a set of
different messages, so the message type can be differentiated through the nlmsg type field.
The same applies for the sequence number nlmsg seq that can be used by the protocol message
to establish some correlation between requests and replies, for example. The nlmsg pid field
follows the same semantics as in sockaddr nl except that is now applies to source address.
struct nlmsghdr {
__u32 nlmsg_len; /* Length of message including header. */
__u16 nlmsg_type; /* Type of message content. */
__u16 nlmsg_flags; /* Additional flags. */
__u32 nlmsg_seq; /* Sequence number. */
__u32 nlmsg_pid; /* PID of the sending process. */
};
The protocol messages themselves, referred as “doi msg”, are composed by an header
(doi msghdr) and a payload (doi payload). The header has a packet identifier (id), a DOI
identifer (doi) and a field to tell the size of the payload - payload len. The nlmsg seq could be
reused instead of defining an id, since they can provide the same functionality. Since the DOI
protocol is layered on top of Netlink messages, it was decided to keep the different semantics
even if both variables are fulfilled with the same values.
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struct doi_msghdr{
unsigned int id;
unsigned char doi;
unsigned short int payload_len;
} doi_msghdr;
Finally, after the DOI message header, follows the payload containing the request or reply
data. Although Netlink messages are asynchronous, from the DOI protocol point of view the
DOI messages follow a “request→reply” philosophy. Therefore, the messages can be grouped
as Table 5.3 shows.
Request Message Reply Message Notes
doi msg register portname NONE (the reply message
does not need any reply
payload data; the success/-
failure is directly obtained
by the message type)
Used when registering and
unregistering port names,
respectively after a bind()
and socket destruction.
doi msg resolve request doi msg resolve answer First resolution request
and answer, after named
SYN segment.
doi msg validate request doi msg validate answer Validation request and
answer, after named
SYN/ACK segment.
doi msg revalidate request doi msg revalidate answer Re-validation request and
answer, after named ACK
segment.
Table 5.3: DOI protocol messages (request and consequent reply) used for data exchange
between the DOI LKM and the DOI Resolver.
In Appendix D.1 the different protocol message structures are detailed. Every DOI request
can succeed or fail, i.e. the validation logic may decide to proceed with the connection or to
abort it. This is signaled through a variable named result, where a “0” indicates an abort
and a “1” tells the operation had success or the connection should proceed, depending on the
context.
A global view or port name encapsulation is shown in Fig. 5.3. One or more portname’s,
each one composed by an header and data, possibly with some additional data are all en-
capsulated in a DOI message. The structure of the latter one depends on the message type,
identified in the Netlink message header. Note that while the doi msghdr ’s id field has the
same value as nlmsg seq, the portname’s id means totally a different thing - it is the integer
used for socket correlation during the three-way handshake.
For the purpose of abstracting the underlying protocol details, a set of functions were
developed as seen in Appendix E. They masquerade the API differences found in Netlink
sockets between kernel and user processes.
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Figure 5.3: Global view of port name encapsulation, in several layers, starting with DOI
messages and their respective encapsulation in Netlink messages.
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Chapter 6
Evaluation
In order to evaluate the features described in Chapter 4, some basic TCP client/server
programs were implemented using the new sockaddr in named structure. They ran in a server
with the modified Linux kernel, as mentioned in Chapter 5. Some well known applications
were also patched, like the Apache2 web server and Netcat utility. Apache2 was partially
patched to bind to a specific port name. Fedora 7 Netcat source package was used as a basis
to build a command line application supporting both port number and port name bindings.

Syntax:
−b bindmode : Bind mode (”0”−port only; ”1”−port name only; ”2”−port+port name)
−o doi : DOI integer identifier , used within the port name header;
−P portname : port name data, defined as a null terminated string;
−L psize : port name total size , including port name header and data
(null padded if needed);

 
Listing 6.1: New command line options syntax for enhanced Netcat
As security is delegated to DOI Resolvers, there were no specific tests to address this neither
the time to implement a DOI Resolver covering authentication algorithms.
6.1 Conformity testing
Conformity tests consisted in the evaluation of two attributes: correctness and trans-
parency. Correctness means that introduced changes must be correct, according with the
standards. Transparency means that changes or features introduced in the proposed models
must be transparent to current TCP stacks. In other words, already deployed solutions must
interact correctly with the modified systems, without having to change the first ones. From
a macro view, this translates into four items:
1. correct TCP connection establishment;
2. RST segment when a named connect is issued to a legacy TCP stack;
3. interaction with firewalls;
4. interaction with NAT boxes.
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For SRM, all possible combinations of server port name bind modes with client connection
methods were tested successfully within and between machines with the standard and the
modified TCP stack, as shown in Table 6.1. Clients with old TCP stacks can only connect to
port numbers (cases 3,4) and servers with old TCP stacks can only handle connection requests
including a valid port number (cases 2,4). Clients with new TCP stack (cases 1,2) can either
connect by port number or name but the latest will only be fully understood by the new port
name aware TCP stack (case 1).
Server-side stack
new old
Client-side new X1 X2
stack old X3 X4
Table 6.1: Interoperability between current (old) TCP stacks and the new proposed stacks,
implementing either the Simple or Enhanced TCP Name Resolution models.
When using ERM, successful named connections can only be established between endpoints
with the new TCP stack and a common DOI (case 1). A named SYN, although conforming with
TCP, will not be processed as expected by the server endpoint (case 2). Legacy connections
can occur between any type of stack, even if they are intended to servers following the ERM
architecture (cases 3,4).
The integration with current firewalls and NAT boxes was evaluated by the following tests.
Firewall Test [SRM,ERM] The proposed architecture should integrate with firewalls.
Procedure:
1. Two hosts, H1 and H2, should be initially configured for the SRM scenario;
2. in H2, a TCP server is bound to the name “test” and port number 12000;
3. in H2, run and configure iptables as a firewall, enabling access only to TCP port 0:
# Accept from all to ports do TCP port 0
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 0 -j ACCEPT
#iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 12000 -j ACCEPT
# drop remaining traffic
iptables -A INPUT -j DROP
4. issue a connection request from H1 to H2, specifying the port name data “test”;
5. repeat the connection request, enabling access only to TCP port 12000;
6. repeat the connection request, enabling access to both TCP ports 0 and 12000;
7. repeat the tests using ERM in hosts H1 and H2;
Expected Result: The first connection request will fail because the ACK segments
uses the resolved port instead of 0. The second connection attempt will fail since the
named SYN ist sent to the unallowed TCP port 0.
Result: Ok, it is possible to establish a connection only when both ports 0 and the
resolved one are allowed in the firewall. The output of conntrack1 shows that iptables
sees two connections: (i) one in SYN RECV state that corresponds to the received SYN
1A LKM for maintaining connection state tracking. Its state can be seen in /proc/net/nf conntrack file.
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and (ii) another one in ESTABLISHED state caused by the last two segments that use
the resolved port - SYN+ACK and ACK.
NAT Test [SRM,ERM] The proposed architecture should integrate with NAT boxes, namely
whenever using source IP masquerading (e.g. by routers) and port forwarding (e.g. by
gateways).
Procedure:
1. Two hosts, H1 and H2, should be initially configured for the SRM scenario;
2. in H2, a TCP server is bound to the name “test” and port number 12000;
3. in H1, run and configure iptables to perform source masquerading:
# accept incoming traffic sent to localhost
iptables -A INPUT -i lo -p all -j ACCEPT
# accept outgoing traffic from localhost
iptables -A OUTPUT -o lo -p all -j ACCEPT
# accept incoming traffic from connections already established
iptables -A INPUT -i eth0 -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT
# perform source masquerading
iptables -o eth0 -t nat -A POSTROUTING -j MASQUERADE
# drop remaining traffic
iptables -A INPUT -j DROP
4. issue a connection request from H1 to H2, specifying the port name data “test”;
5. using another host, HG, run and configure iptables so it behaves as a gateway,
forwarding traffic from H1 to H2 (e.g. 192.168.73.128) through HG:
# enable IP forwarding
echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward
# accept incoming traffic sent to localhost
iptables -A INPUT -i lo -p all -j ACCEPT
# accept outgoing traffic from localhost
iptables -A OUTPUT -o lo -p all -j ACCEPT
# accept incoming traffic from connections already established
iptables -A INPUT -i eth0 -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT
# Accept from all to ports do TCP port 0
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 0 -j ACCEPT
# forward TCP/IP traffic to host 192.168.73.128 (H2)
iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -p tcp --dport 0 -j DNAT --to 192.168.73.128
# perform source masquerading
iptables -o eth0 -t nat -A POSTROUTING -j MASQUERADE
# drop remaining traffic
iptables -A INPUT -j DROP
6. repeat the tests using ERM in hosts H1 and H2;
Expected Result: Source masquerading should not affect neither SRM nor ERM. Port
forwarding will not work unless NAT boxes are updated.
Result: The output of conntrack shows that iptables sees one connection in the SYN SENT
state that corresponds to the forwarded SYN. The iptables on HG does not correlate the
named SYN+ACK sent by H2 with the existing connection since the SYN+ACK TCP
source port uses the resolved port instead of 0.
The previous tests depict some problems with existing network elements that must be
updated for a smooth integration with the proposed models as have been presented. Both
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firewalls and NAT boxes suffer from the “problem” of identifying connections based on source
and destination IP addresses plus TCP port numbers.
Several correctness and compatibility issues were discussed along an intense and fruitful
discussion with Dr. Joseph (Joe) Touch, Director of the Postel Center2, active member of
“TCP Maintenance and Minor Extensions Working Group” and editor of several RFCs. The
discussed topics are in essence here summarized.
Port changes during connection establishment Many applications and network equip-
ments identify connections by 〈IPsrc, TCPsrc, IPdst, TCPdst〉 like entries, as happens
with NAT boxes, firewalls (e.g. iptables), among many other. Changing port numbers
during the connection establishment phase may therefore be problematic.
As mentioned earlier, NAT is used everywhere. NAT source masquerading should not
be a problem since it only affects the source IP address and TCP port number. Port
forwarding, applied at server side, might change both the destination IP address and
TCP port number. For NAT to work in the proposed architectures, the NAT box would
have to forward the resolution request to the target host (and maintain internally the
forwarded port name), which would return a resolved port that would be used thereafter
as the connection identifier.
IPSec [19] supports two operational modes: the transport mode and the the tunnel mode.
The first authenticates/encrypts only the transport payload (e.g. TCP segment) while
the latter does the same but for the original, complete IP datagram. In transport mode,
a security association (SA) is established for each of the two opposite packet flows. SA
is a logic concept that serves for tagging traffic ruled by the same security processing.
A SA selector restricts or widens the range of traffic that applies to a given SA. They
are used during lookup of SAD (security association database) entries. Transport ports
may be used as SA selectors, which raise a problem if port numbers are changed during
the connection. One would have to update SAD selection algorithms and policies for
fully supporting port names.
TCP-AO, still being finalized, relies on connection identifiers based on IP addresses
and TCP ports. These are incompatible with the proposed models unless TCP-AO is
updated to work during the name resolution and afterwards.
A possible solution for avoiding the mentioned problems would be the one depicted in
Joe Touch’s Draft for port/name decoupling: choose a random destination TCP port
defined initially by the client in the SYN segment.
Usage of a reserved port TCP port 0 usage is reserved, fact which IANA confirmed. Two
solutions are possible to supersede this problem. One is by using a specific, IANA
registered, port for the context of port names, although port numbers are assigned
having in mind user services, not kernel features. This still does not solve the problem
caused by changing the port number during the connection. The other solution consists
on applying the same philosophy used by Joe Touch’s Portnames Draft. This apparently
solves some problems (e.g. NAT) while avoiding reserving one TCP port number for the
purposes of TCP port names.
2http://www.postel.org
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Practical considerations The usage of a TCP port name option consumes 4 bytes within
the TCP header of segments exchanged during the connection establishment phase.
This might restrict the use of further TCP options although it does not seem a big issue
due to the reduced size of the option itself. More, in ERM the port name can contain
additional data related with the connection (it could even be thought as a means to
transport further TCP options and therefore provide a way to permanently remove the
current restriction on the usage of TCP options).
In SRM there can be only one port name mapping to a certain port number, since the
implementation considers a one to one mapping. This is is not a real limitation because
in current TCP stacks there can be only one TCP server bound to the same port number.
Using large port names might pose some problems. Fragmentation occurs when seg-
ments are large enough [27]. If a fragment is lost, due to network issues, then the
complete TCP segment is lost since it cannot be reassembled. This will lead to the re-
transmission of entire segments, thereby affecting connection establishment time during
the three-way handshake. A similar problem occurs when large windows are used and
SACK is not supported. A maximum MTU of 576 bytes ensures that fragmentation
will not occur. Therefore, the size of port name should be limited to the MTU, minus
the IP and TCP headers. The IP and TCP headers vary from 20 bytes up to 60 bytes,
depending on protocol options. So, an optimistic value for the maximum port name
size would be 576 − 20 ∗ 2 = 536 bytes while a pessimist would be 576 − 60 ∗ 2 = 456
bytes.
The memory usage was another questioned subject. First, because using large names
might lead to fragmentation, so the TCP stack must cache the fragmented segments
for a considerable period. Moreover, using large port names by itself consumes more
memory during packet processing. However, current TCP stacks also demand more
resources whenever they receive more packets. Nevertheless, the question is pertinent
when the retransmission of segments during the three-way handshake is needed.
The port name, in the Simple Resolution architecture, must be somehow kept in memory
by the client for matching the incoming SYN+ACK or RST segments with the named
connection request. In the server side, the port name is just needed during the processing
of the incoming SYN. This additional state informational is not required however in
the Enhanced TCP Resolution model, since segments and their associated sockets are
correlated by an 〈id, doi〉 pair of the port name header.
Concerning SYN Cookies3, when used the hosts ignore the payload on SYN segments [11]
in order to avoid DoS attacks, as the ones originated by SYN flooding. In fact, hosts with
current TCP stacks are as vulnerable to SYN flooding attacks as the modified systems.
While SYN Cookies break the semantics of TCP connection establishment, in ERM that
is preserved and DOI Resolvers can implement complex and even stateless authentication
logic.
Need for TCP name resolution models TCPMUX advantages may be the fact that it is
an already deployed technology, clearly identified by a reserved port number which is
compatible with NAT, ultimately its main advantage.
3http://cr.yp.to/syncookies.html
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The SRM advantages include the fact it uses just one connection while TCPMUX requires
either two connections (one from client to TCPMUX and another from TCPMUX to the
destination service) or else a connection (from client to TCPMUX) followed by some
IPC mechanism (or a fork) to communicate/execute the pretended service. The fact
that SRM does not need any user space service makes it more fault tolerant. Even in
the ERM, part of the logic resides inside the DOI LKM, providing the ground basis for
dealing with faulty DOI Resolvers.
TCPMUX also damages the semantics of TCP because connections towards it always
succeed, even when the connection to the pretended service fails. It also limits the usage
of some names (“help”, “-”, “+”, “〈CR〉〈LF〉”) due to its protocol. As all connections
are directed to TCPMUX on TCP port number 1, this port can be caught by port
scanners and therefore be a preferable attack target. The proposed models maintain
the TCP semantics, do not limit port names content and are resistant to port scanners.
While TCPMUX provides only a naming service, the suggested models extend that and
can include things like authorization+authentication.
Joe Touch’s Internet Draft (rev. “00”) uses names to address servers but it limits the
names to UTF-8 strings. An important advantage of Joe’s model is being NAT friendly,
since the connection identifier, formed by the source and destination IP addresses plus
TCP port numbers, is kept stable during connections’ lifetime.
During the discussion, Dr. Joseph Touch said a quite interesting phrase, when talk-
ing about introducing new features to standards (e.g. protocols) widely deployed. Quoting
Dr. Joseph Touch,
“That’s an uphill battle in the IETF, and would require that you show something broken
in TCP that everyone needs. It’s not sufficient to show a feature that some could use.”
which should be a major concern when thinking on protocol modifications, either due to
changes or to new functionalities.
6.2 Functional testing
The list of functional tests served to validate the new functionalities introduced by the
proposed models and are summarized in the following items.
1. pluggable mechanism to extend current, standard TCP stack;
2. pluggable DOI Resolvers;
3. registration and unregistration of port names, when a TCP server binds and starts
listening or when it stops;
4. re-registration of port names, of current listening TCP servers, when DOI Resolvers
crash/stop and reconnect;
5. correct interruption on the packet receiving logic, resulting in the invocation of the
appropriate DOI functions (resolve, validate, revalidate)
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6. correct correlation of sockets, using the id in the port name header, instead of TCP
port number (along with IP addresses);
7. connection reset whenever DOI Resolver invalidates the operation, upon reception of
named ACK, SYN+ACK and ACK segments;
8. continuation of the connection procedure whenever DOI Resolver validates the operation,
in each step;
9. TCP stack independence between port names in ACK, SYN+ACK and ACK segments;
10. correct “routing” of TCP port names to the correct DOI;
11. use of large port names;
12. RST segment with port name, after a failure in a named connection request to a server
with the modified TCP stack;
13. RST segment with no port name, after a failure in a legacy connection request to a
server with the modified TCP stack;
14. bind mode behavior;
For the purposes of the following tests, TCPx means TCP server “x”, Hx means host
“x”, DOIx corresponds to DOI Resolver “x”. Tests 1. . .10 are applicable only to ERM while
tests 13. . .14 are to be executed in the SRM environment. The tests 11 and 12 are intended
for both models. The detailed tests, their procedures, expected and obtained results are now
presented.
Test 1 [ERM] The proposed architecture should integrate with the existing TCP stack via
a pluggable mechanism.
Procedure:
1. load in H2, using modprobe command, the DOI LKM;
2. in both hosts, start a DOI Resolver with exact name matching for the domain’s ID
“0”;
3. in H2, a TCP server (TCPx) is bound to the name “test”;
4. issue a connection request from H1 to H2, specifying the port name data “test”;
5. unload in H2, using rmmod command, the DOI LKM;
6. repeat the fourth step;
7. repeat the first and fourth steps, in this sequence;
Expected Result: The TCP name service hook (LKM) can be added or removed on
demand.
Result: Ok, only the second connection attempt fails since the DOI LKM is not loaded.
Test 2 [ERM] DOI Resolvers can be available within the new TCP stack via a pluggable
mechanism.
Procedure:
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• in H2, a TCP server (TCPx) is bound to the name “test1234”;
• in H2, a DOI Resolver with exact name matching is started for the domain’s ID
“0”;
• issue a connection request from H1 to H2, specifying the port name data “test”;
• in H2, abort the previously running DOI Resolver and start a new one supporting
regular expression name matching, for the domain’s ID “0”;
• repeat third step;
Expected Result: DOI Resolvers can be added or removed on demand.
Result: Ok, only the second connection attempt succeeds since “test” regular expres-
sion matches the bound name “test1234”, which was a feature provided only by the
second resolver.
Test 3 [ERM] Validate if TCP servers register/unregister name in the DOI, whenever they
“start” or “stop” (listening).
Procedure:
• start a TCP server (TCPx) binding it to the name “test”, associated with DOIx;
• stop TCPx;
Expected Result: TCP servers register/unregister the port name in the appropriate
DOI, whenever their socket state enters LISTEN or CLOSED.
Result: Ok, by analyzing the debug output of DOIx it was verified the reception of
the DOI protocol messages, in both cases.
Test 4 [ERM] Validate if DOI LKM re-registers port names whenever DOI Resolvers restart.
Procedure:
• a DOI Resolver DOIx is started to handle requests for the domain’s ID “0”;
• start a TCP server (TCPx) binding it to the name “test”, associated with DOIx;
• stop or kill DOIx;
• start DOIx again;
Expected Result: DOIx should receive the port name registration after a restart.
Result: Ok, TCP servers are always accessible even after DOI Resolvers restart.
Test 5 [ERM] Validate if packet handling logic integrates with DOI LKM and DOI Resolvers.
Procedure:
• in H1 and H2, a DOI Resolver DOIx is started to handle requests for the domain’s
ID “0”;
• in H2, start a TCP server (TCPx) binding it to the name “test”, associated with
DOIx;
• issue a connection request from H1 to H2, specifying the port name data “test”;
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Expected Result: The processing logic for incoming packets, previously synchronous,
must be asynchronous, that is to say it gets suspended when DOI functions are invoked
(resolve, validate, revalidate) and is resumed when DOI replies come back;
Result: Ok, the connection was established because DOI functions were invoked ac-
cordingly with the enhanced model, as DOIx’s debug output showed, and the packet
handling integrated transparently with DOI;
Test 6 [ERM] Validate if sockets are correctly matched during the three-way handshake,
using the port name header’s id and the TCP port when appropriate.
Procedure:
• establish a named connection between two endpoints, where the fist SYN in sent
towards TCP port 0;
Expected Result: The port name header’s id is used to correlate a SYN with the
SYN+ACK, instead of TCP ports (besides IP addresses). Afterward, TCP ports are
used in the remaining segments.
Result: Ok, the connection was established successfully.
Tests 7,8 [ERM] Validate if three-way handshake proceeds normally, upon a positive ac-
knowledgment from the DOI Resolver and if it’s aborted upon a negative acknowledg-
ment.
Procedure:
• in H1, a DOI Resolver DOIx is started and configured to return success/failure on
validation requests;
• in H2, a DOI Resolver DOIy is started and configured to return success/failure on
resolution and revalidation requests;
• issue connection requests from H1 to H2, for the multiple combinations of DOIx
and DOIy configurations;
Expected Result: When DOI Resolvers are configured to return success on each oper-
ation, named SYN+ACK and ACK segments are sent back, after receiving a named SYN
and SYN+ACK segments respectively. The connection is reset by sending back a RST
segment, whenever DOI Resolvers return a negative acknowledgment.
Result: Ok, the connection could be aborted at any time depending only on the
outcome of DOI Resolver’s decision logic.
Test 9 [ERM] Validate if the port names can be distinct between named SYN, SYN+ACK
and ACK segments.
Procedure:
• in H1, a DOI Resolver DOIx is started and configured to return success on vali-
dation requests besides forcing named ACK segments to contain port name data
“something”;
• inH2, a DOI ResolverDOIy is started and configured to return success on resolution
and revalidation requests besides forcing named SYN+ACK segments to contain
port name data “xpto”;
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• issue a connection request from H1 to H2, specifying the port name data “bla”;
Expected Result: During the three-way handshake all port names can be different
(it’s up to the DOI to define their values).
Result: Ok, the connection was established and the success of three-way handshake
depends only on the outcome of DOI Resolver’s decision logic.
Test 10 [ERM] Validate if the port names are delivered to the right DOI.
Procedure:
• in H2, two DOI Resolvers, DOIx and DOIy, are started for the domain’s ID “0”
and “1” respectively;
• issue two connection requests from H1 to H2, one for DOI “0” and another for DOI
“1”;
Expected Result: DOI protocol messages are delivered to the DOI identified by the
port name header’s doi.
Result: Ok.
Test 11 [SRM,ERM] Validate if the length of port names can be considerable large.
Procedure:
• In H2, a ERM aware host, a DOI Resolver with the exact name matching logic is
started;
• in H2, TCP servers TCPx and TCPy are bound to port names whose sizes are 500
bytes and 4000 bytes, respectively;
• issue two connection request from H1 to H2, by specifying exactly the same port
names as in the last point;
• repeat the second and third procedures in the SRM context;
Expected Result: Even if TCP segments suffer from IP fragmentation, they must be
correctly handled.
Result: Ok, the connections were established successfully. Fragmentation was observed
when using the port name of 4000 bytes.
Test 12 [SRM,ERM] Validate if a named RST, with the original port name, is sent back
whenever a named connection request is made to an unavailable endpoint in a host
with a modified TCP stack.
Procedure:
• issue a connection request from H1 to H2, specifying the port name data “test”
(there must be no TCP server running in H2 associated with the given port name);
Expected Result: A RST should be sent back, containing a port name similar to the
request’s port name.
Result: Ok. In SRM a named RST was sent with the port name “test”. In ERM a
named RST was sent with the port name’s header fields 〈id, doi〉 equal to the ones used
in the named ACK.
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Tests 13,14 [SRM] Validate the correct behavior of TCP server’s bind mode logic.
Procedure:
• in H2, a TCP service (TCPx) is bound to the port 12000 and name “test”, with
bind mode “port name only”;
• issue a connection request from H1 to H2, specifying the TCP destination port
12000;
• in H2, rebind (TCPx) with bind mode “port + port name only”;
• issue a connection request from H1 to H2, specifying the TCP destination port
12000 or the name “test”;
Expected Result: A standard RST, with no port name, is sent back whenever a
legacy connection request is made to a service with bind mode permitting only named
connection requests.
Result: Ok, the first connection attempt returned a standard RST while the remaining
connection requests succeeded.
6.3 DOI testing
The DOI tests are focused on the validation of the resolution logic implemented in the
DOI Resolvers and also in the test of some of its features:
1. exact match logic;
2. regex resolver logic;
3. validate DOI registration;
4. DOI Resolver graceful close;
For the purposes of the following tests, Hx means host “x”, DOIx corresponds to DOI
Resolver “x”. The detailed tests, their procedures, expected and obtained results follow.
Test 1 Validate the resolution logic of the Exact Match DOI Resolver (DOIx).
Procedure:
• in H2, a TCP service (TCPx) is bound to the name “test”;
• issue a connection request from H1 to H2, specifying the port name data “test”;
• validate if DOIx resolves to the bound TCPx service;
• issue a connection request from H1 to H2, specifying the port name data “tes”;
• validate if DOIx does not resolve to the bound TCPx service;
Expected Result: The connection is established with success to TCPx service in the
first connection attempt.
Result: Ok, by analyzing the debug output of DOIx it was verified the correctness of
the resolution logic.
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Test 2 Validate the resolution logic of the REGEX DOI resolver (DOIr).
Procedure:
• in H2, a TCP service (TCPx) is bound to the name “test123”;
• in H2, a TCP service (TCPy) is bound to the name “test456”;
• issue a connection request from H1 to H2, specifying the port name data “test4”;
• issue a connection request from H1 to H2, specifying the port name data “test12”;
Expected Result: The first connection is established to TCPy server while the second
one is established to TCPx.
Result: The resolution logic was successful and TCP connections were established as
expected.
Test 3 Validate the DOI registration logic to only allow one DOI Resolver per DOI.
Procedure:
• in H1, a DOI Resolver is started to handle requests for the domain’s ID (doi) “0”
(there must be no DOI Resolver already running for that domain);
• in H1, another instance of the DOI Resolver is started, also for the same doi ;
Expected Result: Ok, only one DOI Resolver instance is able to register for a given
domain ID.
Result: Ok, the first DOI registration succeeds but the second one fails.
Test 4 Validate that a DOI Resolver can be stopped at any time and that unregisters itself
from the LKM, in a graceful close way.
Procedure:
• in H1, a DOI Resolver DOIx is successfully started for the domain’s ID “0”;
• in H1, an abort by means of a SIGINT signal (e.g. a CTRL+C) is sent to DOIx);
• in H1, DOIx is started once again for the domain’s ID “0”;
Expected Result: After the abort request, DOIx sends immediately a deregistration
message to the LKM and exits. After that, starting again DOIx succeeds.
Result: Ok, DOI Resolver was promptly aborted, on user request, and thereafter it
could be started successfully for the same domain.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future work
The main purpose of this work was to conceive and implement a secure TCP-layer name
service. As mentioned in Chapter 1, many deployed TCP services are vulnerable to attackers
due to two reasons: (i) they have bugs which sooner or later will be found and (ii) because
access to them is freely allowed by the transport layer. Although firewalls can impose some
accessing constraints, they are a foreign active element that only “blindly” allow or forbid the
access to services and that do not negotiate any in-band security data which could be used
to validate/authenticate the connection establishment. In fact, both TCP-layer name service
and firewall mechanisms can and should coexist.
Two models were devised for a TCP name service, both by extending the TCP syn-
chronization segments and thus not interfering with the normal data exchange during the
connection. This conforms with the TCP standard and is compatible with existing TCP
implementations.
The first presented model - Simple TCP Name Resolution - consisted of a simple name
service for TCP ports. This name service allows TCP clients to identify services by a port
name, instead of port number, which is more user-friendly. The simplicity of SRM and the
fact that it can be directly integrated into the TCP/IP stack is also an important point. One
security advantage of this addressing mechanism is that it allows services with unusual names,
known only by small communities, to remain undetected by port scanners (i.e. security by
obscurity).
The main disadvantage of SRM is due to its fixed logic, the lack of extensibility which
restricts it to a mere name resolution methodology. No other features, as the ones concerning
security by means of data exchange, can be built into it.
The Enhanced TCP Name Resolution model is a generalization and an improvement to
SRM. First, port names become part of all segments exchanged during the three-way hand-
shake. Second, port names have a semantic meaning depending on the domain of interpreta-
tion they belong or are intended to. Third, the TCP stack is closely integrated with DOIs for
assistance in name resolution, access validation and authentication. Fourth, user processes
(DOI Resolvers) implement the logic that processes semantic port names and decide wether
the connection succeeds or not.
The modular ERM architecture allows a set of advantages over standard and SRM enabled
TCP stacks:
• totaly decouples the TCP connection establishment from strict TCP port addressing;
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• supports name resolution and security mechanisms, including validation, authorization
and single or mutual authentication;
• supports an extensible, fault tolerant mechanism to add pluggable DOI Resolvers imple-
menting the name resolution and connection establishment decision logic.
Similarly to SRM, services are not visible if not properly addressed (whenever name resolu-
tion or DOI Resolver’s validation procedures fail). Therefore, this type of security by obscurity
is also present in ERM.
The drawback of ERM, a consequence of its architecture, is the demand for a modified
TCP stack on both endpoints. There is no possibility of establishing a connection between
a legacy endpoint and an ERM enabled endpoint. So, this model is only applicable to DOI
aware services and hosts.
Both models are transparent to applications, with the minor exception that the socket
bind or connect procedures must be slightly updated. However, in SRM a legacy application
can establish a connection to a named TCP service without modifications.
One problem arose during discussions detailed in Chapter 6: the fact that the destination
TCP port number changed during the connection, even though it happens in the synchro-
nization phase. Both source and destination IP addresses and TCP port numbers are used
by some equipments or applications (e.g. NAT, iptables, firewalls) as a connection identifier.
This problem affects either model. A discussed alternative consists on maintaining the same
connection identifier philosophy in order to assure a quiet integration within already deployed
network equipments.
Our prototype implementation confirmed the compatibility with other TCP implemen-
tations, validated by conformity and functional tests. Furthermore, in SRM we were able
to maintain compatibility with legacy systems, kernels and applications without modifying
them.
The initial proposed objectives were therefore accomplished. Two TCP name resolution
models were studied, implemented and validated through tests. Backward compatibility was
a concern present in each one. The architecture of the enhanced model does not enforce a
strict resolution scheme neither a fixed set of allowed security algorithms. Instead, it allows
a flexible integration between the TCP/IP stack and user processes.
Although TCP lacks by itself a name resolution mechanism and some access validation
rules or security algorithms, we can conclude that all those features can be supported in-band
during the three-way handshake, as proposed by ERM using its DOI Resolvers.
The developed work broadens the usage of TCP ports and allows the connection estab-
lishment to occur depending on logic which may enforce authentication, authorization or
any other security action. In fact, there is now the flexibility to define different domains of
interpretation, each one with its own name resolution rules and protocol.
As future work there is a possibility of writing an RFC to suggest the models here described
or just parts of them, depending on further feedback from the community, specially from the
“TCP Maintenance and Minor Extensions” Working Group.
More future work could also include the implementation of the suggestions discussed
in Chapter 6, along with supplementary tests in heterogenous networks and between hosts
deployed in the Internet. Different DOIs could be studied in detail and evaluated through the
implementation of DOI Resolvers. A specific DOI could also be used to distinguish whenever
the DOI logic is implemented by the final applications themselves, a way to embed the DOI
Resolver functionality directly into clients and servers and to extend the address space of DOIs.
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Linux changes for SRM
The set of modified files within the Linux kernel source code tree and the changes made can
be summarized as follows.
include/linux/in.h: definition of extended sockaddr in structure;
include/linux/skbuff.h: new skb add data kernel function that extends the current func-
tion skb add data to allow adding data available in kernel space;
include/linux/tcp.h: definition of constants for TCP socket binding and extending of struc-
tures like tcp sock, tcp request sock and tcp options received to support port names;
include/net/checksum.h: new csum and copy function that extends the current function
csum and copy from user to allow it to work with source address from kernel space;
include/net/sock.h: changed the get port declaration in the proto structure to support
port name;
include/net/inet hashtables.h: major changes and enhancements including (i) new func-
tion inet lookup established to do socket lookup based also in port name data, used by
modified inet lookup function (ii) new macro INET MATCH PORTNAME to match
sockets (iii) inet unhash support to deal with the port name hash (iv) new port name
hash, based on the new structure portname hashbucket, in order to map port names
into port numbers and extension to the inet hashnfo to use it;
include/net/inet sock.h: changes to inet sock structure to have port name data and some
minor refinements on inet ehashfn and inet sk ehashfn that use an hash (ehash) for
sockets in any STATE except TCP CLOSE and TIME WAIT;
include/net/tcp.h: definition of constants used to set the TCP option for port name;
net/ipv4/af inet.c: extended inet bind to support bind to a local port name;
net/ipv4/inet connection sock.c: extended inet csk get port to do port name lookup be-
fore obtaining a reference to local random and available port;
net/ipv4/inet diag.c: minor fix in inet diag get exact due to the extended inet lookup pro-
totype;
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net/ipv4/inet hashtables.c: minor change in inet bind bucket create to save port name data,
new inet bind hash portname function that extends the functionality of the function
inet bind hash, enhancements in inet lookup listener to do socket lookup for port names,
inet hash connect to hash the port name during connection process;
net/ipv4/tcp.c: changes in tcp init to initialize the port name hash and enhancements to
do tcp setsockopt so it supports the socket option for the binding method;
net/ipv4/tcp input.c: extended tcp parse options to support the new TCP option, mod-
ified tcp rcv synsent state process to remove the socket from the established hash and
add it again but indexed by the server given port instead of destination port number 0
that was used in the connection request;
net/ipv4/tcp ipv4.c: minor changes in tcp v4 get port and tcp v4 err, modified the func-
tion tcp v4 connect to support new fields of sockaddr in structure, enhancements to
tcp v4 send reset to support the port name magic, some add-ons in tcp v4 conn request
and tcp v4 send synack like recording the SYN and the SYN+ACK payload length re-
spectively, update internal structures with port name data during tcp v4 syn recv sock,
modified tcp v4 do rcv to send the port name in the RST packet, enhanced tcp v4 rcv
to obtain the port name from SYN/SYN+ACK/RST packets and to validate the bind-
ing method for incoming connection requests, port name variables initialization in
tcp v4 init sock ;
net/ipv4/tcp minisocks.c: update of TCP synchronization and window variables in the
function tcp create openreq child and their correct validation in tcp check req ;
net/ipv4/tcp output.c: enhancement in tcp syn build options and tcp transmit skb to sup-
port the new TCP option, modified tcp make synack and tcp connect to add the port
name and update TCP synchronization and window variables in this last function.
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Appendix B
Summary of Linux changes for
ERM
The modifications here presented were made having the simple model as basis, thus they are
incremental. The Linux kernel source code tree was modified as follows.
include/net/inet hashtables.h: changed structure portname hashbucket to use the new
resolved portname and resolved portname len instead of portname and portname len;
inet unhash had also to be updated for that reason; macro INET MATCH PORTNAME,
used by inet lookup established, had to be modified to use only the port name header
(portnamehdr) to do the socket match logic, and not the whole port name content; a
similar logic was applied for looking up items inside a list in inet unhash;
include/net/inet sock.h: changes to inet sock structure to store more port name variables
(resolved portname, acked portname, client portname, server portname and respective
lengths); modified inet ehashfn to not use port name’s length to index elements and use
the port name identifier field instead, during the hash index calculation;
include/net/request sock.h: changed the structure request sock ops, by adding support
for port name parameters in the send reset declaration;
include/net/sock.h: added the declaration of DOI interface functions register portname, un-
register portname, resolve portname, validate portname and revalidate portname to the proto
structure;
include/net/tcp.h: definition of constant used to distinguish the different types of named
segments (NAMED SYN, NAMED SYNACK, NAMED ACK, NAMED RST ); defini-
tion of function prototypes tcp async synack and tcp async ack for dealing with asyn-
chronous messages coming from DOI;
net/ipv4/af inet.c: extended inet bind to use resolved portname and added the hook to
interface DOI through register portname;
net/ipv4/inet connection sock.c: modified inet csk get port to use the resolved portname
nomenclature, while maintaining the port name→port number mapping semantics (names
are compared by looking just at the portnamehdr);
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net/ipv4/tcp input.c: extended tcp parse options to support named ACK segments; mod-
ified tcp data queue to ignore payload on named ACK segments; implemented function
tcp async ack and exported it; modified tcp rcv synsent state process to (i) break the
processing logic there by calling validate portname and (ii) to send a named ACK using
tcp send ack named on response to a named SYN+ACK and (iii) to save the resolved
port name in the reserved portname field of the INET socket (client side); included a
reference to the external tcp v4 send reset, so it can be reused in the tcp async ack logic;
minor changes in tcp rcv state process;
net/ipv4/tcp ipv4.c: add the DOI hook in tcp unhash to invoke unregister portname; en-
hancements in tcp v4 send reset to support an incrementing counter, per new connec-
tion, used as id in portnamehdr ; updated tcp v4 conn request to the new nomenclature
and to record some data in some internal variables, like the resolved portname at server
side; initialized some variables in tcp v4 syn recv sock ; restructured tcp v4 do rcv to deal
with the different port names and to break the processing of final ACK of the three-way
handshake, by calling a new and simplified version of tcp check req - tcp check req lite;
implemented and exported the tcp async synack function which interacts with DOI for
validation of a named SYN; enhancements to tcp v4 rcv including the differentiation of
named segments and the asynchronous handling of SYN segments, by calling the DOI
resolve portname function;
net/ipv4/tcp minisocks.c: implemented and exported the DOI tcp async ackchk function,
which is used for validating the last and named ACK in the three-way handshake; imple-
mented tcp check req lite, a function similar to tcp check req but that does not create the
child socket, just makes the validations and invokes the DOI revalidate portname primi-
tive; minor changes in tcp check req; added more port name related input parameters to
tcp child process and inherent logic updates;
net/ipv4/tcp output.c: implemented tcp send ack named for sending named ACK segments
(through tcp transmit skb named); modified tcp send ack to call tcp send ack named ; ex-
tended tcp transmit skb and renamed it to tcp transmit skb named in order to support the
inclusion of the TCP port name option on-demand; made a new tcp transmit skb, which
calls tcp transmit skb named with default values, to keep semantics; some updates on
the function tcp make synack due to port name nomenclature and in receive window
calculation; minor changes in tcp connect init ;
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Appendix C
Setting up a Linux kernel hacking
environment
C.1 Kexec+Kdump and Crash
Kexec1 is a series of patches for the Linux kernel, which provide an API, through system
calls, to load a kernel from within another running kernel without rebooting the latter. There
is a RPM package, kexec-tools, that provides the necessary tools to load the kernel. A typical
usage example for kexec is depicted in Listing C.1.

# kexec −l /boot/bzImage −append=”root=/dev/sda1”
# kexec −e

 
Listing C.1: Kexec usage example for loading the kernel image bzImage with the arguments
“root=/dev/sda1”
Another tool that comes with the RPM package is kdump. Kdump2 is a crash dumping
solution which integrates closely with Kexec. When a crash occurs, the “kdump kernel” is
booted, while keeping the memory preserved. It then creates a consistent dump file of the
state of the previously running kernel. In /etc/kdump.conf it’s possible to specify if the dump
is saved locally or even exported to another host by FTP, SCP, etc, for further analysis.
The “capture” kdump aware kernel must be loaded into a reserved memory area, that the
original kernel must not use. This is configured in the boot loader. An example is shown for
GRUB in Listing C.2, where the original kernel reserves 128MB of memory, starting at offset
16MB, for the loading of the kdump aware kernel.

title Fedora (2.6.22.9−91.portnames.fc7)
root (hd0,0)
kernel /vmlinuz−2.6.22.9−91.portnames.fc7 ro root=/dev/VolGroup00/LogVol00
rhgb quiet kstack=32 crashkernel=128M@16M
initrd /initrd−2.6.22.9−91.portnames.fc7.img

 
Listing C.2: Part of the GRUB config file, detailing
1http://www.xmission.com/~ebiederm/files/kexec/
http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/linux/library/l-kexec.html
2http://lse.sourceforge.net/kdump/
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Crash3 is a user space tool used to analyze either running Linux systems or kernel core
dump files, most probably an outcome of a Linux kernel crash. By merging the functionalities
of the GDB debugger, Crash features include access to the kernel log messages, to the list of
the running processes, to the list of opened file descriptors and network connections among
many other. One feature that is of great interest is the possibility of analyzing a kernel crash
event in detail, by looking at the stack, the registers and the kernel logs. From the stack
analysis, obtaining the sequence of the called functions is straightforward.

# crash /proc/kallsyms /usr/src/linux−2.6.22.i686/vmlinux /mnt/kdumps/vmcore

 
Listing C.3: Crash usage example (vmlinux is the kernel image and vmcore the dump)
Crash can be obtained from http://people.redhat.com/anderson/ as a SRPM package.
Configuring a system with kexec+kdump and crash simplifies kernel hacking a lot.
C.2 Ksplice
A very important contribution coming from the MIT is Ksplice4. This tool provides an
hot patching mechanism for the Linux kernel itself. From the user point of view, it only
requires an uncompresses kernel source tree and the source of the modified files (or (.diff
files). The implementation is quite interesting and makes use of two kernel modules that will
help during the hot update process. The tool starts by building the original kernel source
tree and another one with the given patches. Then, it compares the binary object files to
find out which functions were modified. Finally, it extracts the code into another object file
containing the binary code that will be inserted into kernel space by the mentioned kernel
modules. Ksplice works by modifying all references of the modified functions, within the live
kernel, with fresh references to the updated versions of those functions. This works great if
the changes are just concerned with the logic provided by the function internals. However, if
changes are semantic, affecting data structures types, Ksplice cannot, at this point, proceed
with the hot update.

user@localhost:˜$ mkdir ˜/linux−source/ksplice
user@localhost:˜$ cp /boot/config−2.6.22 ˜/linux−source/ksplice/.config
user@localhost:˜$ cp /boot/System.map−2.6.22 ˜/linux−source/ksplice/System.map
user@localhost:˜$ cd ˜/linux−source/kernel
user@localhost:˜/linux−source/kernel$ cp printk.c printk.c.modified
user@localhost:˜/linux−source/kernel$ ksplice−create −−diffext=.modified ˜/linux−source
Ksplice update tarball written to ksplice−2d3i4jgp.tar.gz
root@localhost:/home/user/linux−source/kernel# ksplice−apply ./ksplice−2d3i4jgp.tar.gz
Done!

 
Listing C.4: Ksplice usage example
Unfortunately, Ksplice only appeared during 2008 and therefore there was no time to use
it within this thesis context.
3http://people.redhat.com/anderson/crash_whitepaper/
4http://web.mit.edu/ksplice/
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Appendix D
Structures Definition
D.1 DOI Protocol Messages
#define MAX_PAYLOAD 1024 /* maximum payload size*/
#define NETLINK_TEST 17
#define DOI_MSG_TYPE_REGISTER 0x30
#define DOI_MSG_TYPE_REGISTER_OK 0x31
#define DOI_MSG_TYPE_REGISTER_NOK 0x32
#define DOI_MSG_TYPE_UNREGISTER 0x35
#define DOI_MSG_TYPE_UNREGISTER_OK 0x36
#define DOI_MSG_TYPE_UNREGISTER_NOK 0x37
#define DOI_MSG_TYPE_RESOLVE_REQUEST 0x38
#define DOI_MSG_TYPE_RESOLVE_ANSWER 0x39
#define DOI_MSG_TYPE_REGISTER_PORTNAME 0x40
#define DOI_MSG_TYPE_REGISTER_PORTNAME_OK 0x41
#define DOI_MSG_TYPE_REGISTER_PORTNAME_NOK 0x42
#define DOI_MSG_TYPE_UNREGISTER_PORTNAME 0x43
#define DOI_MSG_TYPE_UNREGISTER_PORTNAME_OK 0x44
#define DOI_MSG_TYPE_UNREGISTER_PORTNAME_NOK 0x45
#define DOI_MSG_TYPE_VALIDATE_REQUEST 0x46
#define DOI_MSG_TYPE_VALIDATE_ANSWER 0x47
#define DOI_MSG_TYPE_REVALIDATE_REQUEST 0x48
#define DOI_MSG_TYPE_REVALIDATE_ANSWER 0x49
struct doi_msg_register_portname{
unsigned short int resolved_port;
unsigned short int resolved_portname_len;
} doi_msg_register_portname;
struct doi_msg_resolve_request{
unsigned short int portname_len;
} doi_msg_resolve_request;
struct doi_msg_resolve_answer{
unsigned short int resolved_port;
unsigned short int resolved_portname_len;
void *resolved_portname;
unsigned short int server_portname_len;
void *server_portname;
unsigned char result;
} doi_msg_resolve_answer;
struct doi_msg_validate_request{
struct sock *sk;
struct sk_buff *skb;
unsigned short int portname_len;
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unsigned short int resolved_portname_len;
} doi_msg_validate_request;
struct doi_msg_validate_answer{
struct sock *sk;
struct sk_buff *skb;
unsigned short int acked_portname_len;
void *acked_portname;
unsigned short int client_portname_len;
void *client_portname;
unsigned char result;
} doi_msg_validate_answer;
struct doi_msg_revalidate_request{
struct sock *sk;
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct request_sock *req;
struct request_sock *prev;
unsigned short int server_portname_len;
unsigned short int acked_portname_len;
} doi_msg_revalidate_request;
struct doi_msg_revalidate_answer{
struct sock *sk;
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct request_sock *req;
struct request_sock *prev;
unsigned char result;
} doi_msg_revalidate_answer;
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Appendix E
Function Prototypes
E.1 DOI Protocol API - User Processes (DOI resolvers)
/∗ send a DOI message, through a Netlink socket, with the given DOI payload data ∗/
void send doi msg(int sock fd ,unsigned int pid, unsigned int id ,unsigned char doi,
unsigned char doi msghdr type, unsigned short doi msghdr payload len,
void ∗payload);
/∗ receive a DOI message, from a Netlink socket, with the given flags for recvmsg() ∗/
int receive doi msg flags ( int sock fd , struct msghdr ∗msg,int flags);
/∗ receive a DOI message, from a Netlink socket, with no specific recvmsg() flags ∗/
int receive doi msg(int sock fd , struct msghdr ∗msg);
E.2 DOI Protocol API - Kernel (DOI interface LKM )
/∗ send a DOI message, through a Netlink socket, with the given DOI payload data ∗/
void send doi msg(struct sock ∗nl sk , unsigned int pid, unsigned int id ,
unsigned char doi msghdr type, unsigned short doi msghdr payload len,
void ∗payload);
/∗ send a DOI message, through a Netlink socket, with the given DOI payload data ∗/
void send doi msg with header(struct sock ∗nl sk, unsigned int pid, unsigned int id ,
unsigned char doi msghdr type, unsigned short hdr payload len,
void ∗hdr payload,unsigned int payload len, void ∗payload);
/∗ send a DOI message, through a Netlink socket, with the two given DOI payloads ∗/
void send doi msg with header2(struct sock ∗nl sk, unsigned int pid, unsigned int id ,
unsigned char doi msghdr type, unsigned short hdr payload len,
void ∗hdr payload, unsigned int payload1 len, void ∗payload1,
unsigned int payload2 len,void ∗payload2);
/∗ receive a DOI message, from a Netlink socket ∗/
void receive doi msg(struct sock ∗nl sk , struct sk buff ∗∗skb, int ∗err );
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